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Freud and Critical Legal Studies: Contours of a
Radical Socio-Legal Psychoanalysis
DAVID S. CAUDILL*
"The success of critical legal studies will be in part deternuned by the
extent to which they succeed in bringing together the diverse theoretical
traditions on which they seek to draw."'
INTRODUCTION
In the growing literature associated with Critical Legal Studies ("CLS"),2
one occasionally reads that the movement, in part, employs Freudian ideas.3
The same is said of the Frankfurt School, 4 but one can easily point to the
writings of Herbert Marcuse' and Ench Fromm6 for unambiguous devel-
opments and revisions of Freud's work. While numerous references to
Freudian psychoanalysis or social. theory appear in CLS scholarship,7 the
connection between Freud and CLS is not clear. Indeed, Robin West's
recent exposition of Freudian jurisprudence counts critical legal theorists
among Freud's opponents.8
* Ph.D., 1989, Vrije Umversiteit te Amsterdam; J.D., 1981, University of Houston;
B.A., 1973, Miclhgan State University; Assistant Professor, Washington and Lee University
School of Law. This Article is a substantially modified version of a paper presented on March
23, 1988, to the Southwestern Social Science Association annual conference (Houston, Texas),
as part of a panel discussion on Critical Legal Studies. The author is grateful to his fellow
panelists-Professors Tom Denyer (University of Texas-San Antonio), Steve Mansfield (Augusta
College) and Malik Simba (Clarion Umversity)-for their helpful comments on the original
paper, and also to Peter Gabel (New College of Califorma) and Robin West (University of
Maryland Law School) for reading the final manuscript. Additionally, the author thanks both
the Frances Lewis Law Center for the research grant that supported the completion of tls
Article, and Richard Redding, Research Assistant, Frances Lewis Law Center, for his help.
I. Hunt, The Theory of Critical Legal Studies, 6 OxrorD J. LEOAL STUD. 1, 3 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YAu L.J.
461 (1984). A bibliography of recent CLS-onented articles, symposia and books appears in
each issue of the Newsletter of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies edited by Alan
Freeman and Betty Mensch at SUNY Buffalo Law School.
3. See, e.g., Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293, 304 (1984); Trubek, Where the
Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. Ra,. 575, 607 (1984).
4. See, e.g., Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want To Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247,
250 (1984); Trubek, supra note 3.
5. See H. MAcusE, ERos AND CinMzATOr, A PmLosopMcAL INQUiRY INTO FkEUD
(1955).
6. See E. FRomm, THE CRIsis OF PsYcHOANALYsIs: EssAYS ON Fnnu, MARX AND SOciAL
PsYcHowOay (1970).
7. See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
8. West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's Theory
of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. Ray. 817 (1986). Of course, Freud's writings are sufficiently
ambiguous to inspire various and conflicting interpretations of lus theories.
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This Article explores the use of Freudian concepts in CLS. However,
because of the scattered and often incongruous references to Freud in CLS
writings, and the attendant necessity of relying upon literature outside the
CLS canon (including Freud's own work and the work of some of his
disciples, revisionists and critics), the present effort includes an inquiry as
to what Freud might mean to CLS. More generally, this Article should
offer some insights as to how CLS-an amalgam of many intellectual
movements and methodological techniques-borrows from (and assumes
familiarity with) various theoretical traditions.
In Part I, I consider the problems inherited by CLS as a critique of legal
ideology, namely the difficulties in defining ideology and describing its
operation, and the need for self-criticism on the part of the ideology critic.
In Part II, I briefly re-introduce several of Freud's famous notions about
the individual and society Part III consists of a series of qualifications and
distinctions concerning the somewhat narrow scope of this analysis, all
necessitated by the understated fact that Sigmund Freud; like Karl Marx,
is a major figure in Western thought and society. Much of Freud's writing
and influence will thus be ignored in the pages that follow.
Parts IV and V discuss, respectively, the so-called Freudian Left9 (espe-
cially Marcuse) and the influence of Freud on Structuralists (especially
Jacques Lacan). Neo-Marxian Critical Theory and Structuralism generally
are acknowledged to be foundational to much that we call CLS scholarship. 0
In Part VI, I explore several actual and possible connections between CLS
and the Freudian tradition, and conclude by suggesting some avenues for
clarifying and developing that relationship. Finally, Part VII focuses on the
use of Freudian concepts in the explication and critique of legal ideology,
with particular reliance upon Lacan (and Althusser's commentary on Lacan),
Peter Gabel and the early Habermas.
The primary aim of this study is not to explain Freud's views, as legions
have done already, but rather to contribute to the understanding of CLS
and its potential in American legal scholarship.
I. CLS As A CRrIIQuE. OF LEGAL IDEOLOGY
While there is no central or core theory shared by all scholars associated
with CLS, conceiving the eclectic movement as a form of ideology-critique
helps to explain the methodology and terminology of many CLS adherents.
Ideologies, in the sense of worldviews or cultural belief systems, generate
and inform communal life and thought. When an ideology is hidden (or
9. See P ROBINSON, THE FRluDiAN LEFT: WmHELM REICH, GEZA RoHmIM, HERERT
MARCUSE (1969).
10. See generally Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structuralism and Contemporary Legal Schol-
arship, 21 NEw ENG. L. REv 209 (1985-86).
[Vol. 66:651
FREUD AND CLS
unconscious), its power to obscure alternatives and to create false necessities
is greatest. The critique of ideology seeks to disclose belief systems not only
to enhance understanding and meaningful commumcation within a com-
munity, but to challenge and change social processes. Two problems,
however, confront the ideology critic. First, is there evidence of ideologies,
and how they operate, for example, within legal processes and institutions?
Second, how does the critic overcome his or her own belief system, or,
more generally, on what basis does the critic recommend change?
"Ideology" has various meanings. In some Marxian formulations, the
term has pejorative connotations-ideology as false consciousness-and
refers to that which masks social contradictions and thereby legitimizes
oppressive institutions.' "Ideology" is also used to describe the coherent
set of collective beliefs of any social group.'2 In CLS literature, the term
"ideology" often connotes "the beliefs that individuals hold about law or
the set of beliefs, ideas, and values embodied in the legal institutions and
legal materials ... of a particular society.' 1 3 However, ideologies also
operate, according to some CLS scholars, to marginalize alternatives and
distort social knowledge-a pejorative sense of the term.' 4
Some political theorists and sociologists have questioned the assumption
that members of a society share a common set of beliefs that constitutes
common sense or that legitimizes asymmetrical relations of power. David
McLellan theorizes that a dominant ideology will generally be accepted by
the ruling class, but that lower classes may be ignorant of, or indifferent
to, the domnant ideology. 5 John Thompson argues that societies are more
likely "stabilized by virtue of the diversity of values and beliefs and the
proliferation of divisions between individuals and groups."' 6 Ideology, for
Thompson, is not grounded in consensus, but in everyday language where
11. See R. Gauss, THE IDEA OF A CRmcAL THEORY: HABERMAS AND THE FRANKFuRT
SCHOOL 12-19 (1981). For an example of such an approach with respect to legal ideology, see
M. TiGAR & M. LEvy, RE EcnoNs ON LAw, CAPrrAwsM, AND LEoAL HISTORY (1977), reviewed
by Koffler, Review Essay, III ALSA FoRum 67 (Dec. 1978).
12. See R. Gauss, supra note 11, at 9-10. Attempts to define ideology continue to appear
in sociological and political literature. Lewins suggests that the preoccupation with the function
of ideology in society, associated with Marman approaches, has eclipsed questions of the
content of ideology. Lewins, Recasting the Concept of Ideology: A Content Approach, 40
BarT. J. Soc. 678 (1989). For a recent functionalist account, see Nielson, The Concept of
Ideology: Some Marxist and Non-Marxist Conceptualizations, 4 RETHiiNG MARXIM 146,
169 (Nov. 4, 1989) (The author argues that conceptions of ideology as any set of closely
related ideas or beliefs tend to miss "the way in wluch ideologies help generate hegemomc,
ruling-class ideas which will make people come to accept a social order which sustmns the
interests of that doimnant class.").
13. Kornhauser, The Great Image of Authority, 36 STAN. L. REv. 349, 376 (1984).
14. Id. at 377-79.
15. D. McLEL.AN, IDEOLooY 73 (1986).
16. J. THoMPsoN, STUDIEs iN THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 5 (1984).
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"meaning is mobilized in defense of [relations of] domnnation." 17 The study
of ideology is therefore construed as an investigation into "the ways m
which meaning (signification)" legitimates, hides and neutralizes power in
society."8
Even if a workable definition of ideology is established as a common set
of beliefs or as a set of limitations on thought and power embedded in
everyday language, questions remain as to how legal ideology works-how
is "the population in general or some particular section . influenced by
the ideological products of the legal process?" 19 Compounding the problem,
a program of ideology-critique proceeds in the shadow of its own ideology,
and critics must account, in a process of self-reflection, for their own
ideological presuppositions or, in another formulation, their given, linguistic
framework. Critical legal theorists can escape neither belief nor language in
their analyses of legal culture.
These problems, coupled with the recurring accusations that CLS literature
is vague, incomprehensible, impractical and nothing but Legal Realism
revisited, plague critical legal research. My thesis is that psychoanalytic
theory offers insights with which to confront some of the problematic
aspects of CLS-insights that are already contained within the radical
traditions on which CLS draws.
II. FRirDLk PSYCHOLOGY
A. Influence and Ideas
Within the history of psychology, Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic theories
represent (in Kuhman terms) a revolutionary breakthrough between para-
digms. As with Einstein in physics, we identify pre-Freudian and post-
Freudian perspectives on the problems of the discipline. 20 Freudian
17. Id. at 35, 61; cf. Kavanagh, Ideology, in CRmcAL TERMS FoR LimrARy STUDY 312
(F Lentricclua & T. McLaughlin eds. 1990) ("[I]deological analysis maintains its edge-that
which prevents it from becoming a form of social psychology-only by keeping our eyes on
the relations of cultural texts to questions of politics, power, and/or class.").
18. J. THOMpSON, supra note 16, at 35, 131; cf. Brenkman, The Other and the One:
Psychoanalysis, Reading, The Symposium, in Lrr aTr AnD PscHoAiALysIs: Tim QUESTION
oF RFuamio: OTHmwisE 396 (S. Felman ed. 1982).
L6vi-Strauss' studies of mythic thought and symbolic exchange m primitive
societies, Barthes' analysis of the cultural products and practices of consumer
society as a specific mode of semiological connotation, and Derrida's deconstruc-
tive reading of philosophy, which treats "concepts" not as instances of con-
sciousness grasping truth or reality but as elements within a textual process-all
of these researches [sic] have made it possible to consider "ideology" as discourse
or semological operation or text.
Id. at 445.
19. Hunt, supra note 1, at 12.
20. See Mujeeb-ur-Rahman, The Freudian Paradigm, in Tim FaEuDiAN PARADiOM: Psy-
CHOANALYsIS AND ScimNTIIc THouGHT 3 (M. Mujeeb-ur-Rahman ed. 1977).
[Vol. 66:651
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psychoanalysis has also influenced sociology21 and political theory, " as well
as literature, art, education, religion and other disciplines.2 Perhaps most
important, however, is the popularly acknowledged impact of Freud on our
lives in general. 2' "Much that was new in psychoanalysis has become
accepted wisdom m our culture and has been absorbed even by people who
have not read Freud[ .... "2
At the same time, many of Freud's formulations have been ignored or
have met with hostility in academia.2 Freudian theory is often the source
21. See R. BococK, SiGmuND FRmD 7-8 (1983) (noting the influence of Freud upon Talcott
Parsons and Erik Erikson).
22. See id. (noting the influence of Freud upon Horkheuner, Marcuse and Habermas).
23. C. HAIL , A PRnMR OF FaitmzN Ps~cHoLox 17 (1954); see Meltzer, Editor's Intro-
duction: Partitive Plays, Pipe Dreams, 13 CamcAL INQUIRY 215 (1987). The introduction. is
to a symposium entitled The Trials of Psychoanalysis in which Hall writes:
Psychoanalysis has infiltrated such diverse areas as literature (to which it owes
its myths), linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, history, feminism, psychology,
archeology, neurology, to name some. And it is in the notion of "some,"
perhaps, that lies the crux of the problem. For there is in psychoanalysis an
overt conviction that it exists as the ultimate totality, of which everything else is
a part.
Id. at 216.
With respect to literature, see generally Brooks, The Idea of a Psychoanalytic Literary
Criticism, 13 CRICAL INQUIRY 334, 336 (1987) (discussing traditional psychoanalytic criticism,
which tends to analyze either "the author, the reader, or the fictive persons of the text," and
arguing for a return to the text). Brooks -asserts:
[Psychoanalytic perspectives in literary study must ultimately derive from our
conviction that the materials on which psychoanalysts and literary critics exercise
their powers of analysis are in some basic sense the same: that the structure of
literature is in some sense the structure of the mind-not a specific mind, but
. the dynamic organization of the psyche, a process of structuration.
Id. at 336-37 (emphasis in original); see also E. Wkosir, PsycHoANALYTIc Cmimctsm: THoRY
I PRACTICE (1987) (discussing criticism of art and literature generally); Famm AND TnE
Humswrrms (P. Horden ed. 1985) (anthology including contributions on biography, art history
and classical studies).
On the use of psychoanalysis in historical studies, see generally P. GAY, FREUD FOR
HISToRANs (1985) (arguing that psychoanalytic interpretation is essential to lustoncal interpre-
tation). See also LaCapra, History and Psychoanalysts, 13 CRITICAL INQUIRY 222 (1987) (arguing
that historical analysis is inherently a part of psychoanalysis).
24. See Gelman, Finding the Hidden Freud, NEwswEmi, Nov. 30, 1981, at 64 ("[Freud]
gave the world more than a theory and a therapy. He provided a world view. His ideas about
dreams, religion, creativity and the unconscious motivations underlying all human behavior
are so pervasive that it would be difficult to imagine twentieth-century thought without
them.").
25. S. FRosH, THE PoLuTcs oF PSYcHOANALYsIs: AN INTRODUCTION To FaUDiAN AND
POST-FREUDIN THEORY 1 (1987) (Freudian "concepts of repression, sexual desire and the
unconscious [are] often implicit in four] 'common-sense' understandings of ourselves and each
other.").
26. See, e.g., Y. GABRnL, FRn AND SocIETY 2 (1983); A. GROlmAUM, Tan FOUNDATIONS
OF PSYCHOANALYSIS: A PmosopmcAL CRmQuE (1984) (questioning the clinical credentials of
psychoanalysis and identifying fallacies in Freudian methodology). But see Sachs, In Fairness
to Freud: A Critical Notice of THE FOUNDATIONs OF PSYCHOANALYSIS by Adolf Griinbaunm, 98
Pam. R-v. 349, 351 (1989) (arguing that Grdinbaum's study contains "major misreadings of
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of controversy, especially among psychiatrists, and it continues to challenge
traditional ways of thinking about human natureY
While the theories and influence of psychoanalysis are the subjects of
thousands of books and articles, one may identify several key ideas asso-
ciated with Freud. First, the recogmtion of sexuality as a fundamental and
complex motivational force, and the theory of repression in which painful
desires and ideas are driven into the unconscious, have been considered two
of Freud's major discoveries. 2 Second, Freud is primarily responsible for
the therapeutic approach that promises access to the dynamics of mental
life. 29 Third, and most important for the present study, Freud's later writings
Freud").
In the popular press, a recent issue of The Atlantic Monthly included a report on Allan
Hobson's challenge to Freud's dream theories. See Dolmck, What Dreams are (Really) Made
Of, ATLANaic MoNTi'LY, July 1990, at 41-61.
27 S. FROSH, supra note 25, at 1. See generally Gilman, The Struggle of Psychiatry with
Psychoanalysis: Who Won?, 13 CRITICAL INQUIRY 293 (1987) (containing a brief history of
the "struggle" with attention to the questions of the "scientific" or medical status of
psychoanalysis).
28. Y. GABRmL, supra note 26, at 1; see S. FREUD, FivE LECTUREs ON PsycHo-ANALYsis
21-28, 40-48 (J. Strachey ed. & trans. 1957) (second and fourth lecture respectively) [hereinafter
S. Fa uD, FrvE LEcTuaRs]. The second lecture (of five given at Clark University in 1909)
describes the concept of repression, while the fourth lecture explains the Freudian emphasis
on sexuality. Freud openly acknowledged
that this assertion of [the predominance of erotic life] will not be willingly
believed. Even workers who are ready to follow my psychological studies are
inclined to think that I over-estimate the part played by sexual factors
Unluckily even doctors are not preferred above other human creatures in
their personal relation to questions of sexual life, and many of them are under
the spell of the combination of prudery and prunence which governs the attitude
of most "civilized people" in matters of sexuality.
Id. at 40-41. Of course, critics of Freudianism remind us that Freud did not "discover" the
unconscious-a concept pre-dating psychoanalysis, and also that modern schools of psychology
place less emphasis on sexuality than did Freud. On the latter point, see D. SCHULTZ, A
HISTORY OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY 356 (3d ed. 1981). Regarding early conceptions of the
"Unconscious," see Meltzer, Unconscious, in CRIcAL TERMS FOR LITERARY STUDY, supra
note 17, at 147-48.
29. S. FROSH, supra note 25, at 2; see S. FRauD, AN AuTOBmoIGRmCAL STUDY 74-90 (J.
Strachey trans. 1952) (originally appeared in 1925 in a collection of autobiographical studies,
by leaders in medicine, entitled Die Medizin der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen; Strachey's
translation was first published in the United States mn 1927) [hereinafter S. FREuD, AN
AtrroBioGRAipmcAL STUDY]. Freud here explains the method of free association, analytical
interpretation, transference (an intense emotional relationship between patient and analyst
wherein the patient re-experiences repressed emotions), and the importance of dreams and
everyday slips and mistakes to psychoanalysis. The latter phenomena (dreams, slips and
mistakes) of normal life parallel, for Freud, pathological symptoms, since explanation of such
phenomena requires "the same assumptions-the repression of impulses, substitute-formation,
compronse-formation, the dividing of the conscious and the unconscious into various psychical
systems " Id. at 90. Therefore,
psychoanalysis was no longer a subsidiary science in the field of psychopathology,
it was rather the foundation for a new and deeper science of the mind which
would be equally indispensable for the understanding of the normal. [A]
path lay open to it that led far afield, into spheres of universal interest.
[Vol. 66:651
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suggest that the concepts of sexuality, repression and the unconscious, as
well as the psychoanalytic therapeutical method, are not only significant for
understanding and helping the individual, but are useful in social analysis. 0
B. Dynamics of the Mind
As is well-known, Freud's later theory of personality introduced three
mental systems: the id, the ego and the super-ego. The id is the primary,
subjective reality, existing prior to the individual's experience of the world.
Driven by instinct, it functions, in the service of the primordial pleasure
principle, to avoid pain and find pleasure.3 ' The id may be bound or
controlled, however, by the ego, a secondary mental process, which is in
turn governed by the reality principle.3 2 The reality of the external world
requires thinking or problem-solving, a plan of action and control of
instinctual desires. The ego also, in its adjustment function, governs the
super-ego, which consists of moral ideals and the conscience, including
traditional values and other social ideals learned in childhood. 33 Roughly,
30. See generally R. BococK, supra note 21. See, e.g., S. FREUD, Tan FUTURE OF AN
ILLUSION (W.D. Robson-Scott trans. & J. Strachey ed. 1964) (first appeared in translation in
1927) [hereinafter S. FREUD, Tan FuruRE OF AN ILLUSION]; S. FREUD, CIVlIZATION AND ITS
DiscoNTErrs (J. Strachey ed. & trans. 1961) (first appeared in translation, by J. Riviere, in
1930) [hereinafter S. FREUD, CvlUzAIoN AND ITS DiscoNmEris]. In writing these books, Freud
remarked:
I perceived ever more clearly that the events of human history, the interactions
between human nature, cultural development and the precipitates of primaeval
experiences (the most prominent example of wlch is religion) are no more than
a reflection of the dynamic conflicts between the ego, the id, and the super-ego,
which psychoanalysis studies in the mdividual-are the very same processes
repeated upon a wider stage.
S. F..rD, AN AuroBIooAPmcAL SrUY, supra note 29, at 138 (1935 postscript to the 1929
translation).
Significantly, however, Freud's later writings on society are not the primary materials for
radical social psychoanalytic theory. Lacan's "return to Freud," discussed below, "is essentially
a return to the spirit of the earlier works." R. HARLAND, SuPEamucTmaAism: Tan PmosoPHY
OF STRuCTuRALIsM AND Posr-STRuCTuRALIsm 34 (1987). "The radical aspect of Freud lies
precisely in the climcal origins and usage of his theories," not in his later "philosophic
aspirations." P ROAZEN, FRtEuD: PouricA AND SOCIAL THouirr 17-18 (1968).
31. C. HALL, supra note 23, at 22-27; see S. FREuD, Tan Eo AND THE ID 9-17 (J. Riviere
trans. & J. Strachey ed. 1960) (first appeared in translation in 1927) [hereinafter S. FREUD,
Tan Eo AND rnE ID]; S. FREUD, AN OuTLINE OF PsYcHO-ANALYsis 14-18 (J. Strachey trans.
& ed. 1949) (first appeared in translation in 1940) [hereinafter S. FREUD, AN OUTLIN OF
PsYCHo-AALY ss].
32. C. HAL, supra note 23, at 27-31; see also Freud, Formulations Regarding the Two
Principles in Mental Functiqning (1911) (M.N. Searl trans.), in S. FREUD, GENAL PsYcHo-
LoGIcAL THEORY 21-28 (P Rieff ed. 1963) [hereinafter S. FauD, GENERAL PSYCHOLoICAL
THEORY].
33. C. HALL, supra note 23, at 31-35. We "see this same ego as a poor creature owing
service to three masters and consequently menaced by three dangers: from the external world,
from the libido of the id, and from the severity of the super-ego." S. FRErD, TaE Eoo AND
Tan ID, supra note 31, at 46; see also S. FREUD, AN AUroBIooGRPHICAL STuDY, supra note
29, at 113 ("The super-ego represents the ethical standards of mankind.").
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then, the id corresponds with biological processes, the ego with the higher
mental processes (and interaction with reality) and the super-ego with
socialization and cultural tradition 4
Faced with the frustrations, conflicts and anxieties of life, the ego may
seek realistic solutions or deny, falsify or distort reality through various
defense mechamsms. 3 Repression, for example "forces a dangerous mem-
ory, idea, or perception out of consciousness," and thereby blinds a person
to the internal or external threat. 36 Projection, another defense mechanism,
is the process of objectifying neurotic or moral anxiety, wherein the indi-
vidual unconsciously rationalizes away personal responsibility by blaming
another.3 7 As with repression, projection is an escape from conscious self-
examination and results in a distortion of reality. Reaction formations
likewise hide awareness of an instinct by concentrating on its opposite." As
34. C. HALL, supra note 23, at 34. For a discussion of the other elements involved in
Freud's theory of personality, including distribution and disposal of psychic energy, instincts,
cathexis and anti-cathexis and the various forms of anxiety, see id. at 36-71.
35. Id. at 85; see S. FRsuD, AN OUTUNm OF PSYCHo-ANALYsIs, supra note 31, at 52-61.
[The] ego is fighting on two fronts: it has to defend its existence against an
external world that threatens it with annihilation and against an internal world
that makes excessive demands. It adopts the same methods of defense against
[both]
Whatever the ego [does in efforts of defense,] whether it is repudiating a
portion of the external world or whether it seeks to reject an instinctual demand
from the internal world, its success is never complete and unqualified [lit
is only necessary to remark what a small proportion of all these processes become
known to us through our conscious perception.
Id. at 111-12, 119.
36. C. HALL, supra note 23, at 86; see S. FituD, F vE LEcTurs, supra note 28, at 21-
28. Freud identified, in his early studies of patients suffenng from hysteria,
a wishful impulse which was in sharp contrast to the subject's other wishes and
which proved incompatible with the ethical and aesthetic standards of his per-
sonality. [The] idea which had appeared before consciousness as the vehicle
of this irreconcilable wish fell a victim to repression, was pushed out of con-
sciousness with all its attached memories, and was forgotten. [Repression]
was thus revealed as one of the devices serving to protect the mental personality.
Id. at 24.
37 C. HALL, supra note 23, at 89-91; see S. FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRiNcn'LE 23
(J. Strachey trans. & ed. 1961) (first translated in 1922 by C.J.M. Hubback).
[A] particular way is adopted of dealing with any internal excitations which
produce too great an increase of unpleasure: there is a tendency to treat them
as though they were acting, not from the inside, but from the outside, so that
it may be possible to bring the shield against stimuli into operation as a means
of defence against them. This is the origin of projection
Id. (emphasis in original).
38. C. HAL, supra note 23, at 91-93. Freud wrote:
In the obsessional neurosis, as we know, the phenomena of reaction-formation
predominate
The reproaches of conscience in certain forms of obsessional neurosis are just
as painful and tormenting [as in melancholia, but it] is remarkable that the
[Vol. 66:651
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an example, extreme notions of chastity may be a denial of one's sexual
desires; more generally, rigid conformity with any social rules may be a
demal of one's rebellious desires. Fixation and regression, also defense
mechanisms, are related to stopping or reversing psychological growth to
avoid anxiety. 9 In all of these cases, the ego deals with anxieties by distorting
or denying reality.40
Freud's early work on hypnotism with Josef Breuer convinced him that
some psychological afflictions are caused by repressed episodes, and that if
a patient can bring to consciousness and verbally express his or her feelings,
the affliction may be cured. 4' The psychoanalytic method as developed by
Freud involved overcoming the patient's predictable resistance and then
analyzing and interpreting the previously unconscious material. 42 For
obsessional neurotic, in contrast to the melancholic [whose strong super-ego
"rages against" the ego], never takes the step of self-destruction; he is as if
immune against the danger of suicide We can see that what guarantees the
safety of the ego is the fact that the object has been retained. In obsessional
neurosis it has become possible for the love-impulses to transform themselves
into impulses of aggression against the object. Here again the instinct of destruc-
tion has been set free and it aims at destroying the object, or at least it appears
to have this aim. These tendencies have not been adopted by the ego; it struggles
against them with reaction-formations and they remain in the id.
S. FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID, supra note 31, at 75-78.
39. C. HALL, supra note 23, at 93-97; see S. FREUD, AN OuTLINE OF PsYcHo-ANLysis,
supra note 31, at 27 ("It has been found that in early childhood there are signs of bodily
activity to which only ancient prejudice could deny the name of sexual, and which are
connected with mental phenomena that we come across later in adult love, such as fixation
to a particular object, jealousy, and so on."); see also Freud, Three Contributions to the
Theory of Sex in THE BASIc Warrnos OF SIGMUND FREUD 553-629 (A.A. Brill ed. & trans.
1938). "All the factors which injure the sexual development show their effect in that they
produce a regression, or a return to a former phase of development." Id. at 626-27 (emphasis
in original).
40. C. HALL, supra note 23, at 96.
41. Brill, Introduction to TBE BAsic Wrrmos oF SIGMUND FREUD, supra note 39, at 7-9.
Freud recognized that symptoms are over-determined, that is, caused by many psychological
events. See S. FREUD, Fiv LEcTuREs, supra note 28, at 38.
In his account of one of Breuer's patients, who suffered from "hysteria," Freud observes
that when "she was put under hypnosis, it was possible, at the expense of a considerable
amount of labor, to recall the scenes to her memory; and, through this work or recollecting,
the symptoms were removed." Id. at 19. Freud, of course, abandoned hypnotism in favor of
the "talking" cure and eventually the process of free association. See S. FREUD, AN AUTO-
BIOGRAPHIcAL STUDY, supra note 29, at 48-76.
42. Brill, supra note 41, at 10. In one of Freud's formulations:
The analyst, who listens composedly but without any constrained effort to the
stream of associations and who, from Ins experience, has a general notion of
what to expect, can make use of the material brought to light by the patient
according to two possibilities. If the resistance is slight he will be able from the
patient's allusions to infer the unconscious material itself; or if the resistance is
stronger he will be able to recognize its character from the associations, as they
seem to become more remote from the subject, and will explain it to the patient
Thus the work of analysis involves an art of interpretation
S. FREUD, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STUDY, supra note 29, at 77 (emphasis in onginal). Freud
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example, anxiety hysteria, a form of transference neurosis, symbolizes or
dramatizes for the analyst a conflict between the id and the ego, the
primitive and the ethical self; similarly, psychosis results from a conflict
between the ego and the external world, and narcissistic neurosis from a
conflict between the ego and the super-ego. 43 Significantly, these disturbances
are, for Freud, present in varying degrees in all people." Thus, everyday
jokes, slips of the tongue, fantasies and dreams reveal the workings of the
unconscious and the universality of the illusions and tensions within each
person's mind.
Although psychoanalysis grew into an international movement in the
decades following Freud's death (infiltrating much of Western social and
literary study) and then fell into disrepute among mainstream psychologists,
a renewed interest in Freud and the psychoanalytic tradition is apparent
outside the discipline of psychology and even within some of the discipline's
movements (such as object-relations theory).4 5 That tradition, neophytes
quickly realize, is a picture of disagreement and uncertainty Beyond mere
revisionism, some schools of thought inspired by Freud have developed
theories that are fundamentally different from Freud's." Nevertheless, nearly
all psychoanalytic approaches seem to share the concept of a dynamic and
ordinarily inaccessible unconscious in which the residues of childhood and
various instinctual (especially sexual) impulses motivate everyday thought
and action. 47
also posited a pre-conscious, midway between the conscious and the unconscious, "which
contains memories of which one is unaware, but which one can eventually recall with some
effort." Brill, supra note 41, at 13; see Freud, A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis
(1912), in S. FRE D, GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 32, at 49-55.
43. Brill, supra note 41, at 12; see Freud, Neurosis and Psychosis (1924), in S. FREUD,
dENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 32, at 185-89.
44. See S. FREuD, ClIVILzATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, supra note 30, at 28. "[E]ach one
of us behaves in some respect like a paranoic, corrects some aspect of the world which is
unbearable to him by the construction of a wish and introduces this delusion into reality."
Id., see also S. FREUD, AN AUTOBIoGRAPHIcAL STUDY, supra note 29.
45. S. FROSH, supra note 25, at 2. In "sociology, literature, film studies and philosophy,
as well as in Marxist and femimst theory, there has been an enormous burgeoning of interest
m psychoanalysis in recent years." Id. at 11.
46. For example, Lacan's model of the psyche (from Freud's earlier works), which identifies
the conscious, the pre-conscious and the unconscious, does not really correspond to Freud's
more developed id/ego/super-ego model. The concept of the super-ego implies a superficial
societal influence on a more basic, individual self's id and ego. In Lacan's unconscious, society
precedes individuality, and Lacan's ego or pre-conscious is a center of resistance rather than
the healthy and rational self. See generally R. HARLAND, supra note 30, at 37-38 (citing J.
LACAN, leCRiTS: A SELECTION 23 (A. Sheridan trans. 1977)).
47. S. FROSH, supra note 25, at 2; see also id. at 3-5 (discussing ego analysis, object-
relations theory, Kleiman theory and Lacaman theory). Robert Wallerstem argues that the
various schools of psychoanalysis, including ego-psychology, object-relations theory, self psy-
chology, as well as the Kleimans, Bionians and Lacanians, share a common ground in their
clinical methods notwithstanding their obvious theoretical diversity. Wallerstem, Psychoanalysis:
The Common Ground, 71 INT'L J. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 3 (1990).
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C. Freud and Society
While psychoanalysis can be viewed solely as an explanatory model for
individual human behavior, "it also contains the possibilities for an ap-
proach that analyzes the mechanisms by which the social world enters into
the experience of each individual, constructing the human 'subject' and
reproducing itself through the perpetuation of particular patterns of ideol-
ogy. ''4" Just as the individual represses threatening ideas, society represses
the individual. 49 Just as the individual seeks to control powerful instincts,
"civilization is built upon a renunciation of instinct. ' 50 Freud believed that
the primordial and dangerous passions of the individual must be controlled
by inherently oppressive social structures.5 ' While these discoveries may be
helpful in social analysis, one immediately notices that they invite pessimism
and provide the basis for an implied conservatism rather than for a radical
or utopian critique of the status quo.
However, Freud's views on sexuality, a seemingly individual and private
matter, are particularly instructive for radical social analysis. First, if one
accepts Freud's thesis that infants have a rich sexual life-a polymorphous
perversity that seeks pleasure without inhibitions-then social repression of
such infantile sexuality is, at some point on the road to adulthood, justified.
The implication is that "normal" sexuality is not biological and that, in
anthropological terms, different societies will have different views of nor-
mality, and in critical terms, alternatives to socially acceptable sexuality are
imaginable.5 2 Second, and more important to the present study, is "the
recognition that what Freud describes is the way society enters into the
essence of the human individual, organizing the instincts where usually we
consider that we are most privately ourselves." 53
In the radical Freudian scheme, it is not that an already established
individual consciousness is conditioned or shaped by social interaction, but
48. S. FRosH, supra note 25, at 11.
49. See N. BROWN, LiFE AGAINST DrTH 3 (1959); H. MAcusE, supra note 5, at 1I.
50. S. FR=U, CIVIIZATION AND ITS DiscoNrmrs, supra note 30, at 44.
51. S. FROSH, supra note 25, at 40. See generally S. FRnuD, CiVLZATiON AND ITS
DiscoNTmqTs, supra note 30.
52. S. FRosH, supra note 25, at 46. Regarding Freud's views on infantile sexuality, see S.
Fneum, Fivn LEcrupm, supra note 28, at 40-48.
A child has its sexual instincts and activities from the first; it comes into the
world with them; and, after an important course of development passing through
many stages, they lead to what is known as the normal sexuality of the adult.
There is even no difficulty in observing the manifestations of these sexual activities
in children; on the contrary, it calls for some skill to overlook them or explain
them away.
Id. at 42.
53. S. FRosi, supra note 25, at 46.
1991]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
rather that society has an unconscious and formative effect on individual
experience and perception of oneself. and others.14 That is, our social
relations are "themselves only available because of the particular ideological
structures that dominate within a society ,,51 In this view the impulses and
feelings that appear to be so much a part of our "selves" are actually
products of our socialization.56
From the point of view of the critic of ideology, a profound ambivalence
persists in Freud's social writings. On the one hand, Freud was not hopeful
about radical social change and even criticized such hopes as a mere search
for consolation.5 7 On the other hand, the radical tradition inherited from
Freud the promise of the power to analyze, "to display the unconscious
roots of personal and social action, to make this material open to awareness
and hence to make ideology open to inspection and change imaginable."5
Freud's preoccupation with illusions, despite his descriptive and positivistic-
"scientific"-goals, could not help but suggest the possibilities for eman-
cipation and demystification.5 9
To begin my inquiry, I will revisit two traditions-Critical Theory and
Structuralism-that build in part upon Freudian ideas. Significantly, these
two traditions are most often identified as the forerunners of critical legal
scholarship, and both signal a latent role for psychoanalytic theory in critical
legal studies. First, however, the breadth of Freudian scholarship and the
narrow scope of the present study must be briefly acknowledged.
III. QUALIFICATIONS AND DISTINCTIONS
In the foregoing summary of Freudian theory, and in the remainder of
this study, much of Freud's own work and the work of many of his
followers and critics has and will be ignored. While my focus is solely on
Freud's relevance for the critical legal enterprise, a series of qualifications
will serve to acknowledge other uses of Freud and psychoanalytic theory in
law
First, I am almost exclusively concerned with the social aspect of psycho-
analysis, although assessing the implications of Freud's theories for society
requires attention to his early work on the individual psyche as well as his
54. Id. at 46-47.
55. Id. at 47. The Oedipus Complex-involving for Freud the incest taboo, desire opposed
by authority and internalization of authority-symbolizes the individual encounter with society
and describes a possible mechanism by which "social structures are incorporated into individual
consciousness and have a formative role on the ordering of the psyche." Id. at 48.
56. Id. at 52.
57. S. FRzuD, CrrIzATION AND ITs DiscoNTmNTs, supra note 30, at 92.
58. S. FRosH, supra note 25, at 60.
59. Y. GABRmL, supra note 26, at 4.
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later writings about culture. Nor will I discuss the international psychoanalytic
movement, which builds upon Freud's clinical work and writings, involves
an entire field of research and writing on individual, and especially abnor-
mal, psychology, and is of course part-but not an uncontroversial part-
of the practical tradition of psychotherapy and psychiatry 60
Second, I will limit my commentary to Freud's impact upon the Left and
its concerns with ideology, power structures, freedom and criticism of the
status quo. I will not attempt to describe either the numerous other move-
ments of Neo-Freudianism or Freudian revisionism, 61 or the general effect
of Freudian ideas upon Western culture. 62
Third, I am not here concerned with the relationship between Freud and
law generally, including the relationship between mainstream law practice
and psychiatry or psychology,63 the more traditional views concermng the
utility of psychoanalysis for legal scholarship (including Frank's analysis of
60. See generally Restak, Psychiatry in America, WILSON Q. 95, 107-12 (Autumn 1983).
The American Psychoanalytic Association, founded in 1911, has over 3,000 member analysts,
is affiliated with local societies in most major United States cities and accredits over 25 training
institutions. See AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC Ass'N, ABoUT PsYcHoANALYsIS (1985). The Association
publishes the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association and holds national meetings
annually. Another organization, the National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis("NPAP"), derives from the denial of full membership to Theodor Reik, a Freudian who
held a Ph.D., rather than an M.D., m the American Psychoanalytic Association. The NPAP
publishes The Psychoanalytic Review and conducts a training institute.
61. See generally Y. GABRIEL, supra note 26; S. FRosH, supra note 25. Both books discuss
Freud's followers and revisionists. See also E. WRIGHT, supra note 23. Wright provides several
helpful summaries m the context of literary and art criticism. Id. at 56-68 (summarizing ego-
psychology); id. at 69-76 (summanzing Jungian theory); id. at 79-104 (summarizng object-
relations theory); id. at 107-32 (summarizing structural psychoanalysis); id. at 133-56 (sum-
manzing post-structural psychoanalysis); id. at 159-74 (summarizing ideology studies in psy-
choanalysis).
62. See Gelman, supra note 24.
63. See generally M. MOORE, LAW AND PsYCHIATRY: RETHINKwN THE RELATIONSHIP (1984);
Stone, Psychiatry and the Law, in THE HARvARD GumE TO MODERN PsYcIATRY, 651-64 (A.
Nicholi, Jr. ed. 1978) (containing a brief but comprehensive catalogue of issues, including civil
commitment, the insanity defense, competency, capacity, right to treatment and sexual psy-
chopathology). See A. BROOKS, LAw, PsYCHIATRY AND Tan MENT . HEALTH SYSTEM (1974 &
Supp. 1980); D. SummA, PsYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EvIDENCE (1986 & Supps. 1988 &
1989).
Sally Lloyd-Bostock's recent book summarizes British approaches to the use of and insights
from psychology in dealing with witnesses and suspects, acqmring trial persuasion skills,
sentencing, the role of children in legal proceedings and employing psychological and psychiatric
experts. S. LLoYD-BosTocK, LAw IN PRACTICE: APPLICATIONS OF PsYcHoLoGY TO LEGAL
DEciSION MAxiNo AND LEGAL SKci.s (1988). The new textbook by Robert Bastress and Joseph
Harbauch considers various theories from psychology (including psychoanalytic, person-cen-
tered, behaviorist and others) and their use in interviewing, counseling and negotiation. R.
BAsTREss & J. HARBAUCH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATION: SKILLS FOR EFmcTIvE
REPRESENTATION (1990). For recent examples of more specific studies in law and psychology,
see A. FELTHous, Tan PsYcHoTHAPIsT's DUrY TO WARN OR PROTECT (1989); and W
WAOENAAR, IDENTwYIN(3 IVAN: A CASE STuDY IN LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY (1988) (regarding the
trial of John Demlanjuk).
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the myth of coherency,64 Bienenfeld's reconsideration of the Oedipus com-
plex, 65 Goldstein's warnings concerning the limits of psychoanalysis,16
64. Jerome Frank integrates psychoanalytic theory (although rarely mentioning Freud) into
his realist critique of law and lawyers. See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MnD (1930).
Frank identifies a basic social myth, unconsciously reinforced by lawyers, that law is precise
and coherent, rather than vague and unsettled. Id. at 8-9. Acknowledging that his explanation
of this myth is partial, Frank analogizes a child's search for security and authority in his or
her father with the craving of society for finality and rules in the law, and the role of judges
as father-substitutes. Id. at 13-31. "[T]he image of the father [is) hidden away in the authority
of the law " Id. at 269. Legal language, moreover, creates the appearance of such longed-
for definiteness and predictability, thereby hiding the inevitable, non-rational bias in legal
decisions and processes. Id. at 29-32. Frank acknowledges that "relatively superficial" political
bias is obvious, but our
most compelling biases have deeper roots and are far better concealed from
consciousness. To admit their existence would be difficult and painful. Most
of us are unwilling-and for the most part unable-to concede to what an extent
we are controlled by such biases. We are able to delude ourselves by
giving "reasons" for our attitudes. So we persuade ourselves that our lives
are governed by Reasons.
Id. at 31-32.
The radical implications of Frank's study appear undeveloped in legal scholarship, except
in the sense that recent critical legal research inherited the deconstructive (if not the scientific)
methods of Legal Realism. Psychoanalysis seems to have been welcomed into law as another
"partial" (read "not earthshaking") explanation of law and legal institutions and practices.
65. Franz Rudolf Bienenfeld (1886-1961), an Austrian legal scholar, did not complete his
planned book on psychoanalysis and law, but the partial manuscript was eventually published
m two parts. Bienenfeld, Prolegomena to a Psychoanalysis of Law and Justice, 53 CALIF. L.
REv 957, 1254 (1965). Professor Ehrenzweig remarks, in a preface to the Prolegomena, that
the book, if completed, "could well have become the definitive psychoanalytical study of law
and justice." Id. at 959 (preface). Bienenfeld wanted to go beyond earlier psychoanalytical
studies of crime and guilt, which over-emphasized Oedipal aggression, toward an acknowledg-
ment of the Oedipal union. Id. at 962 ("marital obligations are not conditioned by guilt").
The Prolegomena investigates family relations (child/child, parent/child) and claims for justice,
which parallel the structure of the state. State production of legal systems is then described,
emphasizing law as a system of obligations, with particular reference to psychoanalytic research,
Gestalt psychology, Jerome Frank's observations and Piaget's experiments. Bienenfeld analyzes
relative obligations ("social" (mother/child) law, "criminal" (father/child) law, "constitu-
tional" (husband/wife) law and "contract" (between siblings) law); the absolute obligation to
protect life, safety and property; and procedural laws by which obligations are ascertained.
Of interest to the present study, Bienenfeld argues that social law, "which institutionalizes the
rules for survival by support," has been neglected (by identifying law with criminal law) in
most accounts of the psychological origin of law:
The earliest concept of law has its psychological source in the earliest experience
of the mother's directions, guidance, and help in nursing. All elements of law
are in nuce present in this earliest situation. The institutionalization of social law
originates from the desire for support and its satisfaction by the mother.
Id. at 967 (emphasis in original).
For a positive assessment of Bienenfeld's significance for attempts to explain the roles of
rationality and values in judicial decisionmaking, see Gottschall, Bienenfeld's Psychodynamic
Model and the Judicial Process: Toward a New Paradigm in Law?, III ALSA FORUM 33, 34
(Dec. 1978) (dynamic model of the human psyche provides "the missing synthesis for the now
rigidly antithetical behavioral and rationalistic approaches to the judicial process").
66. Joseph Goldstein explores the potential contribution of psychoanalysis to legal theory,
but remarks that the integration "is not close at hand, and the scant beginning has occurred
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Ehrenzweig's "psychosophy," 67 and Schoenfeld's contemporary synthesis6s),
only at a relatively superficial descriptive level." Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and Jurisprudence,
77 YALE L.J. 1053, 1054 (1968). The article is relatively short (25 pages), and the author is as
interested in challenging as in establislung the "mutual relevance" of psychoanalysis and law.
Id. at 1055. "[I]t is important to locate the limits of psychoanalytic theory in understanding
the dynamics of law as a product of, stimulator of, and regulator for human behavior." Id.
at 1059. "Law cannot find in psychoanalysis the moral, political, or social values upon
which to base or evaluate its decisions." Id., see also id. at 1060-64 (danger of misuse of
psychoanalytic insights in cnminal trials); id. at 1071 (similar events may have different
significances to a person over time and to different people at the same time). Goldstein does
suggest a positive role for psychoanalysis in, for example, child custody cases, yet re-emphasizes,
in his conclusion, that psychoanalysis is just another analytic tool for legal scholars and
practitioners. Id. at 1076-77. Students expecting a finished or complete psychoanalytical theory
will be either "duped or disappointed." Id. at 1077.
67. In contrast to Goldstein's emphasis upon psychoanalysis as another partial explanation
of legal institutions and processes, see supra note 66, Albert Ehrenzweig asserts that "the
findings of Freud and of some of his disciples have opened the gate to a new jurisprudence."
A. EHRENZWEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE: ON ETics, AESTHETICS, AND "LAW"-
ON CRIME, TORT, AND PROCEDURE 146 (1971) (Ehrenzweig gives this new science a new name:
psychosophy); cf. Cavell, Freud and Philosophy: A Fragment, 13 CRITICAL INQUIRY 386, 388(1987) (Freud suggested that "philosophy has been fulfilled in the form of psychoanalysis")
(citing Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, in 4 Tan STANDARD EDITION OF ran COMPLEm
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGmuND FREUD 144, 145 (J. Strachey ed. & trans. 1953-74))
[hereinafter CoMPLE-T PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS]; Berthold-Bond, Freud's Critique of Philosophy,
20 MErAPr mosoPHY 274 (1989). Ehrenzweig's thesis that the "age of Plato has yielded to the
age of Freud," A. EHRENZWEIG, supra, at 5, necessitates for im a comprehensive treatment
(Part I) of the history of legal philosophy before turning to psychology and law (Part II). The
relationship between aesthetics and law is explored in Part II, and then an effort is made to
apply psychoanalytic (or "psychosophic") insights to problems in criminal law, torts and
procedure. Ehrenzweig's major theme is that irrational, unconscious feelings at work in the
law (e.g., the desire for vengeance in murder and tort cases, and the belief in the effectiveness
of adversary proceedings before an "impartial" judge or jury) should be identified as inevitable
and then left undisturbed in an effort to reform rational areas of law. See id. at 220-21, 258-
59, 275. But see Weyrauch, Taboo and Magic in Law, Book Review, 25 STAN. L. REv 782
(1973). In his critical review of Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence, Weyrauch writes:
If desire for vengeance is combined with conscious or unconscious racism, it
should not be left undisturbed in the interest of limited law reform even if the
cost is backlash. Professor Ehrenzweig is the last person to deny this aspect
of the problem, as his discussion of civil disobedience [in Nazi Germany] clearly
indicates.
Id. at 806-07 (citing A. EHRENZwEIG, supra, at 87-95). "Backlash" refers to Ehrenzweig's
warning that retributionary "aggression, purportedly displaced, may return with a vengeance."
A. EHirEzwma, supra, at 220.
68. C.G. Schoenfeld attempts to synthesize basic Freudian psychoanalysis with law and to
suggest applications in constitutional law. C.G. SCHOENFELD, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE LAW
(1973). Beginning with the warning that psychoanalytic explanations "are at best partial," id.
at 7 (emphasis in original), Schoenfeld identifies (1) the influence of unconscious motives in
the criminal and the judge alike, and in society with respect to the punishment of criminals,
id. at 12-21, 63-64; (2) the super-ego as the moral and ethical standards that originate in the
family, id. at 22-24; (3) judges as unconscious parent symbols, id. at 40; and (4) examples of
self-deceptive rationalization (e.g., in legal opinions), projection (e.g., fear of big business),
and identification (e.g., with victims of crime), id. at 72-101. When Schoenfeld turns to several
constitutional problems, his arguments are sometimes simplistic, and therefore tentative. For
example, after suggesting that post-Civil War acceptance of judicial review of congressional
law might be explained by "the unconscious wish for parental direction" after a traumatic
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and Freud's own views on law and legal institutions (although I will address
the latter in one limited context69). Thus, I will not be concerned with the
legal problems of criminal behavior, the insanity defense or the testimony
of psychiatric experts, although each are relevant to the general study of
psychology and law 70
Finally, I will emphasize neither femimsm7 l nor the current trends in
event, he calls his explanation "admittedly speculative" and "at best a limited or partial
explanation, since it fails to treat of matters that a sociologist, a political scientist, an historian,
an econormst, or others, might well deem highly relevant." Id. at 114 (footnote omitted).
Likewise, psychoanalytic insights do not seem promising in solving the judicial-activism-versus-
self-restraint debate, except in producing "a greater open-mindedness than now exists." Id. at
136-37 Literalism in constitutional interpretation may be explained by the "unconscious
remnants of the childhood stage of the omnipotence of words," id. at 154; and the balance
of powers may unconsciously symbolize the "balance between the powers of parents and their
children," id. at 202; but "only a beginmng has been made," id. at 208. Given the controversies
surrounding Freudianism, acknowledged by Schoenfeld, id. at 208-09, such a deprecatory
attitude is understandable.
Schoenfeld's most recent book is an attempt to demonstrate a role for psychoanalysis in
law reform. C.G. SCHOENFELD, PsYCHOANALYSIs APPLIED TO LAW (1984). He discusses juvenile
delinquency, mental illness, punishment of criminals, heroin addiction, discretion and inter-
national law. In each case he focuses on unconscious emotional needs that may be overlooked
when law is approached as essentially rational and logical.
69. See infra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 63; Richards, Law, Psychiatry, and Philosophical Analysis (Book
Review), 73 CAImF. L. RPv 1659 (1985).
71. Elizabeth Wright explains that, for Freud, infant sexual instincts are gradually organized
into culturally approved adult sexuality: "The match of biological sex with the sexual role
determined by society is thus achieved, not given." E. WiRucr, supra note 23, at 14. This
"bleak theory of the construction of gender , as was first pointed out [in J. MrrcimLL,
PsYcHoANALYsIs AND FEmINsM (1974),] can be used as an ideological weapon for women to
fight their own oppression [It] enables them to demonstrate that gender is symbolic and
not biological " Id. at 198. The weapon, however, has another edge: "it constructs
woman around the phallic sign." Id. Thus feminism in general has viewed Freud and his
science "as prime perpetrators of patriarchy." Gallop, Reading the Mother Tongue: Psycho-
analytic Feminist Criticism, 13 CRnricAL INQuIRY 314, 314 (1987).
Feminist ambivalence toward Freudianism continues, for example, in recent psychoanalytic
feminist literary criticism, inspired in part by Lacaman psychoanalysis. Id. at 314-15 (Lacan
promotes "language to a principal role in the psychoanalytic drama and so naturally offers
fertile ground for crossing psychoanalytic and literary concerns."). Lacan, however, is often
embraced by feminists as "coolly" as Freud, and debate continues as to "how far [Freud and
Lacan] may be said to serve the feminist cause." E. WRIGHT, supra note 23, at 198. "Gallop
is among those feminists who believe that Lacan's doctrine really does go 'beyond the phallus'
in that he provided a theory about human identity-formation having a generality that applies
no matter what the power-structure is at a given historical moment." Id., see also Kemgan,
Terminating Lacan, 88 S. ATLANTc Q. 993, 997 (1989) ("Lacan's version of psychoanalysis
in [sic] unrelievedly biased toward one gender more so than Freud's, despite the enthusiasm
of some feminists for Encore [LE SEMNAnRE XX. ENcoRE (1975)]."); Miller, The Death of
the Modern: Gender and Desire in Marlowe's "Hero and Leander," 88 S. ATLANTIC Q. 757,
761 (1989) ("[T]he work of Freud and Lacan is equally informed by transferential structures
grounded in the principle of paternity.").
With respect to feminist legal criticism of "male" jurisprudence, and Robin West's recent
rejection of Peter Gabel's "deeply gendered" account of alienation (which draws on Lacanian
psychoanalysis), see infra note 195.
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literary theory72 m my exposition, even though both fields are pertinent to the
topic of Freud and the legal Left. Freud's ideas about gender and language
continue to inspire scholars and to produce controversies that are important
but beyond the scope of this Article. The analysis that follows is based upon
my conception of Critical Legal Studies as an ideology critique, and the actual
and possible uses of Freudian theory within that framework.
IV. FREuD AND CRiTicAL THEORY
"Ihe laws are made by and for the ruling members . ,
While the contemporary Left is accustomed to, if not always comfortable
with, the potential alliance between Marx and Freud, the Frankfurt School's
early introduction of psychoanalysis into Neo-Marxian Critical Theory was
bold and unconventional.74 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno clearly
were interested in integrating the two traditions,75 notwithstanding the
tension between Freud's pessimism (regarding social change) and Marxian
revolutionary hopes.
Erich Fromm, for a time, helped to reconcile Marx and Freud, although
he later disassociated himself from the Frankfurt School and orthodox
Freudianism. Fromm's identification of "psychoanalytic mechanisms as the
mediating concepts between individual and society" established for the Neo-
72. See Brooks, supra note 23; see also E. Wumar, supra note 23 (surveying, with respect
to theories of literature and the arts, classical Freudian (id-psychology) criticism, post-Freudian
(ego-psychology) criticism, archetypal (Jungian) criticism, object-relations theory, structural
(Lacanian) psychoanalysis, post-structural psychoanalysis (Derrida and Bloom) and the critique
of ideology (Deleuze and Guattari)).
73. Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, in 22 Coxprm PSYCHOLOGICAL
WoRKs, supra note 67, at 206.
74. See generally M. HORXHEDMER & T. ADoR o, DiATcTic oF ENUG-TNMENT (J. Cum-
ming trans. 1972). In 1927, for example, the Russian semiologist V.N. Vologinov harshly
criticized Freudianism as a bourgeois ideology that pnvileged biological (and sexual) explana-
tions over the socio-histoncal. V.N. VOLoliNOv, FREUDiAblisM: A MMXIST CRTIQUE 8-10 (1.
Titunik trans. & N. Bruss ed. 1976); id. at 80 ("Freudian psychical dynamics and its mechanisms
are only a projection into the individual psyche of social interrelationships."). On the other
hand, Ernesto Laclau has pointed out that Marxism affirmed.
the opaqueness of the social-the ideological nature of collective representations-
which establishes a permanent gap between the real and the manifest senses of
individual and social group actions. It is easy to see how it is possible to
establish a dialogue with psychoanalysis [by reference to] the action of the
unconscious and to the plurality of "systems" established in the various Freudian
topographies.
Laclau, Psychoanalysis and Marxism, 13 CRMCAL INQUIRY 330, 331 (1987) (A.G. Reiter-
McIntosh trans.).
75. See M. HORUHEIMR & T. ADoRNo, supra note 74; M. JAY, THE DiALEcTI AL ImAcI-
NATION 86-87 (1973).
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Marxists a Freudian component in social criticism. 76 Freud's theory of
psychic repression of essential needs, for example, is strikingly analogous
to Critical Theory's idea of social oppression, and in both cases people are
considered to be generally unconscious of the process. 7
Horkheimer welcomed the growing psychological supplement to Marxian
theory, as did Adorno, yet both grew dissatisfied with Fromm's revision of
Freud's work.71 It was not Fromm, but Herbert Marcuse, who finally
rescued for Critical Theory the revolutionary Freud.
Marcuse's Eros and Civilization plays several roles for those inspired by
Critical Theory and enamored of Freud. First, the book is a criticism of
Freudian revisiomsm. Marcuse retains, at least for their symbolic value,
some of the most controversial concepts in Freud's theory- the death instinct,
the primal horde and the killing of the primal father. While this "archaic
heritage" rejected by the revisionists "defies common sense, it claims, in
its defiance, a truth which common sense has been trained to forget." 79
Second, Marcuse did not accept Freud's pessimism (concerning society) and
implied conservatism, finding instead a critical and liberating tendency, or
"hidden trend," in psychoanalysis.8 0 Third, Marcuse argued that "Freud's
individual psychology is in its very essence social psychology "8'
In the preface to the first edition of Eros and Civilization, Marcuse
immediately identifies the psychological with the political:
[F]ormerly autonomous and identifiable psychical processes are being
absorbed by the function of the individual in the state-by his public
existence. [P]rivate disorder reflects more directly the disorder of
the whole, and the cure of personal disorder depends more directly than
before on the cure of the general disorder.,2
External repression, Marcuse continues, is internalized as self-repression; in
Freudian categories, the repressions of the ego ("in the service and at the
behest of the super-ego") 3 became "unconscious, automatic as it
were ",84 Rather than simply accommodating reality, the super-ego
enforces past reality, the status quo.
76. M. JAY, supra note 75, at 91; see E. FROMM, supra note 6, at 134.
77 J. KLAPWUK, DL4EKTIEK DER VERLICHTING 23 (1976).
78. See M. JAY, supra note 75, at 100-06.
79. H. MARcusE, supra note 5, at 60; see infra text accompanying notes 159-60 (Robin
West's explication of the primal horde and father).
80. Id. at 4, 20; see also id. at 17 ("The notion that a non-repressive civilization is
impossible is a cornerstone of Freudian theory. However, his theory contains elements that
break through this rationalization; they shatter the predominant tradition of Western thought
and even suggest its reversal.").
81. Id. at 16.
82. Id. at xxvii.
83. S. FREUD, THE EO AND THE ID, supra note 31, at 75.
84. H. MARCUSE, supra note 5, at 32.
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Marcuse takes seriously Freud's instinct theory, especially the dualism of
the Life (or Eros) and Death (or Thanatos) instincts, in order to advocate
liberation from repression of such primary drives. He distinguishes basic
repression (necessary for civilization) from surplus (or unnecessary) repres-
sion, and suggests that the latter is a standard for measuring the repres-
siveness of each stage in the history of our culture.85 Marcuse also emphasizes
Freud's distinction between the pleasure principle and the reality principle,
but the latter becomes in today's capitalist society the "performance"
principle, an instrument of domination. "We designate it as performance
principle in order to emphasize that under its rule society is stratified
according to the competitive economic performances of its members. '86
Domination becomes rationalized administration, and the life-enhancing
energy of Eros slowly withers in today's society.
Assessments of Marcuse's synthesis of psychoanalysis and critical social
theory vary. Paul Robinson's sympathetic commentary on Eros and Civili-
zation suggests not only that Marcuse was the Freudian Left, or at least its
major figure, but also that Marcuse succeeded in bringing Freudian theory
into line with the categories of Marxism.87 Stephen Frosh is less impressed,
finding that, in Marcuse's individualistic and libertarian analysis, "social
relations are reduced to pure, unproblematic and unmediated encounters
between totally unalienated individuals." A genuinely radical psychoanalysis,
Frosh argues, needs to concern itself with social structures as well as specific
others, "themselves the carriers of social and ideological messages." 8
Before considering the lesson for legal theorists in Marcuse's Freudianism
and Frosh's warning, another tradition influenced by Freud and influential
in CLS should be considered.
V. FREUD AND STRUCTURALISM
"I suddenly realized . that an intellectual movement could be fash-
ionable without being understood." 8'
85. Id. at 33.
86. Id. at 44 (emphasis in original).
87. P ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 195, 210.
88. S. FRosH, supra note 25, at 160.
89. E. KURZWEI, THE AGE OF STRUCTuRALISM: Li-STRAUSS TO FOUCAULT ix (1980); see
also M. BRADBURY, My STRANGE QUEST FOR MENSONGE: STRucTURAnisM's HIDDEN HERO 2, 4
(1989) (satire of post-modermst criticism). Bradbury writes:
In fact, and to be honest, there is no doubt that Structuralism-Deconstruction
has become, to say the least, chic, and the title 'designer philosophy' is,
though unfair, not totally off target.
[Structuralism and Deconstruction] are, in the realm of cognition, what Texas
is to California in the realm of growth potential and property values, but with
the added advantage of not being directly oil-related.
Id. at 2-4 (emphasis in original).
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Because Structuralism (and, as I will use the term, various post-structur-
alisms that are not radically anti-scientific) implies a search for universal
mental structures manifested in human behavior, literature, and social
relationships and institutions, it is not surprising to find Freudian concepts
employed and refined by thinkers in the Structuralist tradition. L6vi-Strauss,
a founder of the movement, claimed psychoanalysis, alongside geology and
Marxism, as one of his "three nustresses." ' 9 His discovery in myths of
universal and unifying structures was a type of cultural psychoanalysis,
analogous to bringing the unconscious into consciousness. 91 Freudian con-
ceptions of the unconscious continued to be influential in Structuralist
thought, especially in the writings of Althusser, 92 Ricoeur, 93 Foucault,9 and,
less directly, Dernda.95 The most obvious integration of psychoanalysis and
Structuralism, however, is found in the work of Jacques Lacan.
Even a bnef description of Lacan is problematical, for he "makes much
of the fact that he cannot be systematized, that he cannot be 'understood,'
that to understand him is to reify and misconstrue him . . .,96 Given such
warnings, the aim of these remarks is less to capture the essence of Lacaman
theory than to establish the relationships between psychoanalysis and Struc-
turalism and, more broadly, between psychoanalysis and radical social
theory
90. E. KuazwEm, supra note 89, at 14.
91. Id. at 19.
92. See id. at 39-40; infra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
93. See E. KUnzwEL, supra note 89, at 87-98; see also Ricoeur, A Philosophical Interpre-
tation of Freud, in THE PHILosoPi'Y oF PAUIL RiCOEUR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF HIS WORK 169 (C.
Reagan and D. Steward eds. 1978); Ricoeur, The Question of Proof in Freud's Psychoanalytic
Writing, in THE PmILosoPrH oF PAUL RiCOEUR, supra, at 184 (includes a summary of FREUD
AND PmIOsoPHY: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION (D. Savage ed. 1970)).
94. See E. Kurzw m, supra note 89, at 199-201, 239. See generally M. FOUCAULT, MADNESS
AND CIViLIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON (R. Howard trans. 1973).
95. See Hoy, Jacques Derrida, in THE RETURN OF GRAND THEORY IN THE HUMAN ScIENcES
54-55 (Q. Skinner ed. 1985).
96. E. KuazwEm, supra note 89, at 136. Kurzweil notes:
As Clara Malraux once told me, people who listened to [the Pansian sermnars
of] Lacan (including herself) often did not understand what he was saying
Yet they went to hear him and to observe him: he put on the best show in town.
His outrageous behavior provided unexpected excitement, and his statements
always left his listeners in intellectual suspense
Kurzweil, The Freudians, 57 PARTISAN REV. 38, 40 (1990) (excerpt from E. KURzwEI, THE
FREUDIANs: A COMAMTIVE PERSPECTIVE (1989)); see also E. RAGaLAN-SuLLIvAN, JACQUES
LAcAN AND THE PILosOPHY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (1987).
Anglophone readers express the hope that someone will explain Lacan to
them in their own terms. This is simply impossible. To do so would permit an
interlocutor to retain assumed meanings, providing the comfort of resolution,
but only the illusion of understanding. Lacan intended to bring about a recon-
ceptualization of the conventionally assumed and unquestioned words by which
Western people have come to describe themselves.
Id. at x (emphasis in original).
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Ego formation occurs, for Lacan, "through distortions analogous to the
reflections of mirrors within mirrors . . "97 He identifies as fundamental
the "mirror-stage" in the child's development, the child's initial awareness
of itself before the experience can be verbalized or understood. 98 This first
impression or image becomes the basis for construction of a "self" and for
all relationships to come. Thereafter, the child becomes aware of the mother
(the "other body"), of the father (the "Law") and sexual differences, and
of gender roles; concurrently the child discovers language itself. 99 The
97. E. KuRzwEm, supra note 89, at 137; see J. LACAN, supra note 46, at 1-7. Commentators
on Lacan have identified, in the Lacaman conception of the ego, "an extreme and controversial
interpretation of Freud." B. BENVENUTO & R. KENNEDY, THm WORKS OF JACQUES LACAN: AN
INTRoDUCTION 60 (1986). Lacan "thought there was not enough emphasis on the ego's function
of meconnaissance-the refusal to acknowledge thoughts and feelings-and that the later Freud
put too much emphasis on the ego's adaptive functions." Id. at 52. Parting "company with
other analytic schools in his view of the ego," Lacan suggests that "the ego's function is
purely imaginary, and through its functions the subject tends to become alienated." Id. at 60;
see J. LACAN, supra note 46, at 22:
Freud seems . to fail to recognize the existence of everything that the ego
neglects, scotomizes, misconstrues in the sensations that make it react to reality,
everything that it ignores, exhausts, and binds in the significations that it receives
from language: a surprising meconnaissance on the part of the man who succeeded
by the power of his dialectic in forcing back the limits of the unconscious.
Lacan was "opposed to any idea of adjustment to the social environment, and his writings
abound with a tireless polemic against such a notion." B. BE.vEtrro & R. KENNEDY, supra,
at 61 (the "ego's mastery of the environment is always an illusory mastery" for Lacan).
As an aside, it is worth mentioning that Lacan's model of the conscious subject is divided
into two parts or functions,. the moi (roughly, the ego, with indentificatory functions) and the
je (the speaking subject). See generally E. RAG ND-SU.LLvAN, supra note 96, at 1-67.
[The terms "ego" or "self" are misleading in understanding Lacan's concept
of the subject, since they imply a wholeness or totality that he refuted by his
literal reformulation of the Freudian idea of an Ichspaltung or a splitting of the
subject.
Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). Both the mot and theje, m the Lacaman scheme, "participate"
m both the conscious and unconscious "systems." Id. at 42.
98. E. KURzwEiL, supra note 89, at 142-43; see J. LACAN, supra note 46, at 2 (emphasis
m original):
We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full
sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place
in the subject when he assumes an image . This jubilant assumption of his
specular image by the [infant] would seem to exhibit in an exemplary
situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in its primordial form,
before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before
language restores to it, in the umversal, its function as subject.
99. See T. EAGLETON, LITmRARY TimoaY: AN INTRODUCTION 165-67 (1983). In -another
formulation, "[o]nce the child has acquired language, however rudimentary it may be, then
all the pre-verbal structures are radically altered to fit in with the language system. For
Lacan, once the child has the capacity for language, there is a qualitative change in the
psyclucal structure-he becomes a subject." B. BENVENUTO & R. KENNEDY, supra note 97, at
131 ("In Lacan's view, the father introduces the principle of law, in particular the law of the
language system."). Given recent trends in the discipline, many developmental psychologists
would find such statements embarrassingly "Piagetian." See, e.g., Gardner, Scherer & Tester,
Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 Am.
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imaginary order is thus replaced by the symbolic order, Lacan's term for
"the pre-given structure of social and sexual roles and relations which make
up the family and society "100 With the passage into the symbolic, however,
the child loses direct access to the imaginary possession of reality, and
emerges into the restless world of language and repressed desire.'0'
The unconscious, for Lacan, is structured like a language-"a constant
fading and evaporation of meaning, a bizarre 'modernist' text which is
almost unreadable and which will certainly never yield up its final secrets
to interpretation." 10 2 The ego, or consciousness, represses the turbulence by
PSYCHOLOGIST 895, 898 (1989) (citations omitted) ("Adolescent cognitive development is not
stage-like. [In the 1960s and early 1970s, Piaget and others] described cognitive development
as a series of stages in which children's thought had a homogeneous logical structure across
task domains. Recent cognitive development theory, however, has turned away from stage
theones."). But see R. KEGAN, TuE EVOLVING SELF: PROBLEM AND PROCESS IN HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT 73-109 (1985) (defending, from an object-relations perspective, a neo-Piagetian
scheme of child developmental stages, while acknowledging that the "stages" are overlapping
and interrelated).
100. T. EAGLETON, supra note 99, at 167 Lacan posits the Symbolic, Imaginary and Real
orders. J. LACAN, supra note 46, at 30-113. Benvenuto and Kennedy explain:
The Imaginary Order includes the field of phantasies and images. It evolves out
of the [Prototypical] mirror stage, but extends into the adult subject's relationships
with others.
The Symbolic Order is easier to grasp, being concerned with the function of
symbols and symbolic systems, including social and cultural symbolism. Language
belongs to the Symbolic Order, and in Lacan's view, it is through language that
the subject can represent desires or feelings, and so it is through the Symbolic
Order that the subject can be represented, or constituted. The Real Order, on
the other hand, is the most elusive of these categories, and is linked to the
dimensions of death and sexuality Basically, it seems to be the domain
outside the subject [Ilt is what the subject keeps "bumping up against"
B. BENVENUTO & R. KENNEDY, supra note 97, at 81.
101. T. EAGLETON, supra note 99, at 167 Lacan writes:
This moment in which the mirror-stage comes to an end inaugurates the
dialectic that will henceforth link the I to socially elaborated situations.
It is this moment that decisively tips the whole of human knowledge into
mediatization through the desire of the other, constitutes its objects in an abstract
equivalence by the co-operation of others, and turns the I into that apparatus
for which every instinctual thrust constitutes a danger, even though it should
correspond to a natural maturation-the very normalization of this maturation
being henceforth dependent, in man, on a cultural mediation as exemplified, in
the case of the sexual object, by the Oedipus complex.
J. LACAN, supra note 46, at 5-6 (emphasis in original).
Lacan draws on Piaget's work on the linguistic development of children-work that is
nowadays viewed as dated by the dominant schools of psychology. See, e.g., Gelman &
Baillargeon, A Review of Some Piagetian Concepts, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY
167-221 (P Mussen ed. 1983) (questioning Piaget's broad stages of development, each char-
acterized by qualitatively distinct structures).
102. T. EAGLETON, supra note 99, at 168-69.
[The psychoanalyst's] whole experience must find in speech alone its instrument,
its context, its material, and even the background noise of its uncertainties.
[W]hat the psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious is the
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"provisionally nailing down words on to meanings," but articulation is
always an approximation of truth. The "imaginary" reappears in the
conscious and necessary attempt to view oneself as reasonably unified and
coherent. 03 As analyst, Lacan adopts the Freudian emphasis upon dreams
as a means of approaching the unconscious, but Lacan also examines, in
Structuralist fashion, the analysand's speech and associations in general, as
well as the breaks and irregularities in speech patterns.104 Defense mechan-
isms parallel literary devices in the analysis of the language of the uncon-
scious (or of the id, of desire), which interacts with the language of culture
(ordinary speech). 0 Moreover, as a constructive theorist, Lacan proposes
a radical new language of enjoyment and fantasy liberated from unhealthy
repressions.' 06
Several implications of Lacaman theory are apparent for radical social
theory. First, Structuralism as a literary theory helps explain how a legal
text, for example, might "intinudate us because we do not see how the
language got there in the first place."'17 The power of such a text, with its
hidden assumptions, lies in a suppression of its mode of production not
unlike the ego's repression of its own self-constructive processes.ies Second,
Althusser's theory of ideology implicitly relies on Lacan in explaining how
whole structure of language. Thus the notion that the unconscious is merely
the seat of the instincts will have to be rethought.
J. LACAN, supra note 46, at 147.
For a discussion of Lacan's complex reconception of Saussure's linguistic theory, set forth
in J. LAcAN, supra note 46, at 146-78 (essay entitled The Agency of the Letter in the
Unconscious or Reason Since Freud), see B. BENvENUTo & R. KENNEDY, supra note 97, at
103-25, 217-22. See also Meltzer, supra note 28, at 158-60. For Saussure
a linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept [signified] and a
sound-image [signifier]. Saussure claimed that meaning is generated by sig-
nifiers, not just in relation to their signifieds but also according to their position
in the sentence in relation to other signifiers. So, too, Lacan will liken the
unconscious to the movement of the signifier . [Wihat matters is the
meaning generated by the position of the signifier, not the usual meaning
(signified) associated with it.
Id. at 159 (emphasis in original). Using Saussure's terminology, the "unconscious is just a
continual movement and activity of signifiers, whose signifieds are often inaccessible to us
because they are repressed." T. EAGLET oN, supra note 99, at 168 (emphasis in original). The
"potentially endless movement from one signifier to another is what Lacan means by desire."
Id. at 167.
103. T. EAGLETON, supra note 99, at 169; see also B. BENvENutro & R. KENNEDY, supra
note 97, at 56 ("The ego has the illusion of autonomy, but it is only an illusion, and the
subject moves from fragmentation and insufficiency to illusory unity."); id. at 61 ("mhe
human subject will continue throughout life to look for an imaginary 'wholeness' and 'unity."').
104. E. KuRzwnru, supra note 89, at 148.
105. Id. at 148-49.
106. Id. at 153.
107. T. EAGLETON, supra note 99, at 170.
108. Id.
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we come to submit to dominant ideologies. 10 "We tend to see ourselves
. as free, unified, autonomous, self-generating individuals; and unless we
did so we would be incapable of playing our parts in social life."" 0
Nevertheless, we are in fact bound to the social structure that gives us
purpose and identity through its signs and social practices."' Like Lacan's
child with its rmrror-image, the individual subject is supplied with an
idealized image, a misrecognition, of autonomy and freedom.
VI. CmITICAL LEGAL STuDIEs AND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC TRADITION
A. Traces of Freud in CLS
"I think how people get over neuroses is just incredibly mystenous.
You're talking about it just like Freud, in which, you know, you just
spin the wheel, and whatever slot the little ball drops into becomes the
truth. Now we've got collective getting over neuroses."' 12
Explicit references to Freud appear now and then in CLS literature, but
Freudian or near-Freudian terminology abounds. Peter Gabel, who employs
109. Id. (citing L. ALTHUSSER, LENiN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS (B. Brewster
trans. 1971)); see infra notes 179-87 and accompanying text (discussing Althusser's theory of
ideology). But see E. RAoLAND-Suri~vA, supra note 96, at 272:
All ideological readings of Lacan miss the point. In the Marxist Louis Althusser's
famous misreading of Lacan, the subject and the [extenorized yet determinative
Other] are equated so that the conscious subject is both master of Desire and of
language.
110. T. EAGLETON, supra note 99, at 172.
111. Id. (Athusser's view). In Lacan's formulation:
Symbols in fact envelop the life of man in a network so total that they join
together, before he comes into the world, those who are going to engender him
'by flesh and blood'; so total that they bnng to his birth the shape of his
destiny; so total that they give the words that will make him faithful or renegade,
the law of the acts that will follow him nght to the very place where he is not
yet and even beyond his death.
J. LAcA, supra note 46, at 68 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting C. LAW-
STRAUSS, LES STRUCTREaS ALENTAIREs DE LA PARENT (1949)). Thus the subject, as "the
slave of language is all the more so of a discourse in the umversal movement in which his
place is already inscribed at birth, if only by virtue of his proper name." Id. at 148. Frederic
Jameson observes:
Lacan's attention to the components of language has centered on those kinds of
words, primarily names and pronouns, on those slots which, like the shifters
generally, anchor a free-floating syntax to a particular subject, those verbal joints,
therefore, at which the insertion of the subject into the Symbolic is particularly
detectable.
Jameson, Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan: Marxism, Psychoanalytic Criticism, and the
Problem of the Subject, in LITERATURE AND PsycnoANAxysis, supra note 18, at 362.
For a more conventional but similar description of socialization into an already-established
family and then culture, see K. KAYE, THE MENTAL AND SociAL LaE OF BAntms: How PARENTS
CREATE PERSONS 202-21 (1982) (self-concept transmitted to infant through language, child
accommodates to social system, self as product of membership in social system).
112. Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STN. L. Rsv 1, 45 (1984) (emphasis in
original) (Kennedy's response to Gabel) (transcript of a seminar).
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a concept of false consciousness in his work, speaks of the "collective
projection and internalization of an imaginary political authority" as the
"mass-psychological foundation of democratic consent.""' Gabel has also,
however, questioned the adequacy of Freud's theory of "an alienated ego
resulting from the necessary renunciation of instinctual desires" and at-
tempted to improve, by phenomenological description, both the Freudian
and Marxian stones of alienation.1 1 4
David Trubek has characterized legal thought as "a form of demal, a
way to deal with perceived contradictions that are too painful for us to
hold in consciousness.""' Moreover, for Trubek, critical legal scholars are
like Freudian analysts in bringing "to 'consciousness' what is ludden by
hegemonic world views."111 6 Mark Kelman, likewise, identifies Freudian
themes in the CLS emphases upon unconscious self-construction of reality
and distortion of reality by avoidance or denial.11 7 James Boyle's "article on
the "politics of reason," in which he attempts to develop a sort of tool kit
for the CLS project, remarks that Habermas' compelling "idea of belief
structures that were once necessary to group survival but are now merely
empty and repressive traditions has definite Freudian overtones."'' 8 Finally,
Thomas Heller, in Ins helpful study of Structuralism in critical legal thought,
highlights the significance of Freudian images of post-therapeutic freedom
113. Id. at 29 (Gabel's response to Kennedy).
114. Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves, 62 Tx. L. Rav. 1563 (1984).
In spite of the many modifications psychoanalytic theorists since Freud have
made to his original formulations, only [Lacan and R.D. Laing] have produced
theories that ennch the experiential texture of these formulations while retaining
their full critical bite. [Lacan's] descriptions of how the child's desire is
skewed by cultural conditioning is [sic] a phenomenological advance over the
abstractness of Freud 's account, but [his] insistence on the unintelligibility of
desire leaves hun as unable to capture what we are alienated from as Freud
was. [R.D. Laing], who has written very good experiential studies of how
alienation is mediated through the family, has never tried to develop a theory
of social being comparable in scope to Freud's.
Id. at 1565 n.3 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
115. Trubek, supra note 3, at 607.
116. Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
117. Kelman, supra note 3, at 304. Kelman, however, is critical of Peter Gabel's "empty
slogans"-
He says things like "[t]he project is to realize the unalienated relatedness that is
immanent within our alienated situation." But I see too few concrete references
to lived experience in this "specification" to know if he is actually describing a
blissful state-of-nund or a small household appliance. My mind goes utterly
blank when I try to picture Peter's characters [for example, real legal actors
behind juridical abstractions] glimpsing liberation by way of unalienated relat-
edness.
Id. at 343-44 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 112, at 1).
118. Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133
U. PA. L. Ra,. 685, 702 n.49 (1985).
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for Neo-Marxian Critical Theory, for the Structuralist tradition, and im-
pliedly for CLS." 9
Significantly, David Kennedy's recent study on the roles of Critical Theory
and Structuralism in contemporary jurisprudence does not emphasize Mar-
cuse's Freudianism at all, and barely acknowledges Lacan's work. This is
neither wrong nor surprising, but rather confirms that the place of Freud
in CLS is at present a series of suggestive traces. Not only is there no
adoption of psychoanalysis, but no common understanding of Freud's
significance for radical social theory emerges.
B. CLS and the Social Freud
"One of the most distinctive derivations from modern Marxism which
characterizes critical legal theory has been the shift of focus from
economic relations to the focus upon political and cultural relations.
Central to this concern is ideology, conceived as a mechanism which
forms the consciousness of agents."'12
CLS has taken many forms in the literature associated with the movement.
Some choose to emphasize the implications of CLS for radical practice,' 2'
and some appear anxious at times to move beyond (rather than digress
further into) theoretical concerns.'2 Other emphases include textual concerns
and the contemporary debates regarding interpretation, especially of the
United States Constitution,12i the role of CLS in legal education, 24 and
specific attacks on traditional or mainstream legal scholars. 2' One unifying
theme in the CLS canon, however, is the concern with the ideological role
of law in society-legal institutions and processes serve to legitimate hier-
archies, to support hegemomc structures, to hide inequalities and oppression.
I have argued, elsewhere, 26 that CLS is at its best when viewed as an
ideology critique. Nevertheless, Alan Hunt points out that CLS betrays an
unfounded assumption that the legal ideology of judges and lawyers is
somehow "effective in constructing the perception and consciousness of the
dominated in contemporary capitalist societies.' 2 7
119. Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REv 127, 132-33, 158-59 (1984).
120. Hunt, supra note 1, at 11.
121. See, e.g., Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv 469 (1984).
122. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 4, at 289-91.
123. See, e.g., Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in Decon-
struction, 36 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1984).
124. Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in Tm PoLrrcs OF LAW 40 (D.
Kairys ed. 1982).
125. See Hutchinson, Book Review, Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire, 96 YALE L.J. 637
(1987) (reviewing R. DwomiuN, LAw's Eimnmn (1986)).
126. Caudill, Disclosing Tilt: A Partial Defense of Critical Legal Studies and a Comparative
Introduction to the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, 72 IowA L. REv 287 (1987).
127 Hunt, supra note 1, at 11.
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How does legal ideology work to legitimate hierarchical structures? An-
thony Chase investigates, and recommends further inquiry into, mass culture
images of law and lawyers.22 A more fundamental question persists, how-
ever, in the doubt expressed by some ideology critics as to whether a single
invisible ideology exists at all. 129 One might conclude that CLS lacks both
a theoretical foundation for its ideology critique and "an empirical dem-
onstration of the connection between legal ideology and the formation of
popular consciousness.""110 In the face of these questions, I believe we should
reassess Freudian theory and its potential for social criticism.
Charles Lawrence"' considers several theories of racial inequality in his
1983 book review of David Kirp's Just Schools: The Idea of Racial Equality
in American Education. Lawrence's exposition of ideology as an unconscious
defense mechanism is particularly instructive. Using Freudian terms, Lawr-
ence argues that individuals justify, rationalize or even deny uncomfortable
realities-uncomfortable perhaps because of a conflict with what has been
taught to them as morally acceptable behavior. 3 2 "At the societal level,
ideology assumes the role of the defense mechanism in the individual
psyche.' ' 3  While ideology can be viewed as the result of rational calculation
of those in power, Lawrence prefers to view ideology as a symptom-a
symbolic outlet for emotional disturbances."3 The ideology of equal oppor-
tunity is developed by academics, judges, politicians and lawyers identified
with the socioeconomic order but who feel the tension between that order
and their ideals. 35 Lawrence wants to explain not only the illusion of equal
treatment advanced by law-a CLS-like exercise-but also why legal scholars
react by deluding themselves to avoid anxiety and fear. 36 "This self-
mystification occurs on an unconscious level and results in selective percep-
tion.,,137
Lawrence developed his views further in his 1987 article on equal protec-
tion, specifically the doctrine of discriminatory purpose. 3 In Lawrence's
128. See Chase, Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 527.
129. See D. McLELAN, supra note 15, at 73; J. THOMPSON, supra note 16, at 5; see also
Tushnet, Perspectives on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's
"A History of American Law," 1977 Wis. L. REv. 81, 100.
130. Hunt,'supra note 1, at 13.
131. Lawrence, Book Review, "Justice" or "Just Us" Racism and the Role of Ideology,
35 STAN. L. REv. 831 (1983).
132. Id. at 841.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 842 (citing Geertz, Ideology as a Cultural System, in Ti INTERPRETATioN OF
CuLvrvEs 201-02 (1973)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 843-48.
137. Id. at 848; see also R. KOENIGSBERG, THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF RACISM, REvOLUTION
AND NATIONALISM (1977).
138. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (reconsideration of discnminatory purpose doctrine in Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
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analysis, unconscious racism can be explained by reference to the Freudian
theory of repression of guilt and to socio-cognitive psychology's theory of
tacit beliefs and preferences transmitted by culture. 39 "Whatever our pre-
ferred theoretical analysis, there is considerable commonsense evidence from
our everyday experience to confirm that we all harbor prejudiced attitudes
that are kept from our consciousness."' 40 Lawrence extends his analysis by
considering two constitutional theories justifying heightened equal protection
scrutiny and then proposing and applying (hypothetically) a new "cultural
meaning" test. 4' He concludes that unconscious racism violates antidiscn-
mination law.
The analogy between the critique of ideology and psychoanalysis is also
addressed by Raymond Geuss in his study of Habermas and Critical
Theory 142 In The Future of an Illusion, Freud distinguished between error
(false factual belief), delusion (false belief that satisfies a wish) and illusion
(false or true belief that satisfies a wish). 43 Geuss refines the Freudian
scheme toward a "wishful thinking" model of Ideologiekritik, which pro-
ceeds by identifying an illusion, or mistaken belief, and explaining it by
reference to Habermas' "interests."'" Geuss' framework enriches Freud's
concepts because mistake may be caused by an institutional context and not
just individual psychology. 45 This institutional context might cause agents
to make mistakes, thereby serving the interests of others as, for example,
when statisticians work under conditions that cause them to underestimate
unemployment in the service of some powerful group. Such factual errors,
however, are not ideological; thus ideologies might consist of those forms
of consciousness with little or no observational content, such as attitudes,
preferences and normative beliefs. How, then, can the critic label the agent's
belief "false"? Geuss turns to Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity to suggest
a critical possibility- Christianity (for Nietzsche) arises in hatred; a Christian
can't accept hatred as a motive; Christianity requires that its adherents not
recogmze their motives; therefore a Christian who recognizes the hatred
139. Id. at 322-23. Thus the requirement of a racially discriminatory purpose to challenge
a facially neutral law "ignores much of what we understand about how the human mind
works." Id. at 323; see also id. at 329 ("The law has, for the most part, refused to acknowledge
what we have learned about the unconscious.").
140. Id. at 339. Lawrence notes that his purpose is not "to defend psychoanalytic theory
as the definitive description of psychological processes. Rather, I have drawn upon
psychoanalytic theory because it provides a conceptual vocabulary for processes that we have
all observed in our everyday lives." Id. at 331 n.55.
141. Id. at 344-81.
142. R. GEuss, THE IDEA OF A CRITICAl. TiEoRY: HABiRmAs AND TmE FRANKFURT SCHOOL
(1981).
143. S. FREUD, TiE FUTUn oF AN ILLusIoN, supra note 30, at 47-53 (religious belief as an
illusion in Freud's scheme).
144. R. GEuss, supra note 142, at 41; see id. at 45 (containing a discussion of Habermas'
theory of interests with citations to Habermas' own work).
145. Id. at 41.
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implied by Christianity can rationally give up his or her belief. Whether
Christianity is shown as "false" is not important-the point is that the
enlightened agent's own standard of acceptability was sufficient for the
critique. 46
The analogy with psychoanalysis is evident. For both Lawrence and Geuss,
Freudian concepts illustrate how individuals might think and act contrary
to personal morality (Lawrence) or interests (Geuss) because of a ruling
ideology. In Lawrence's example, the ideology is the individual's repressive
defense mechamsm; in Geuss' example, ideology provides a desire or wish
that is false by the individual's own standards.
If the above examples seem inspired by Critical Theory-Geuss by Ha-
bermas, and Lawrence, impliedly, by Marcuse ("repression from without
has been supported by repression from within")147-David Kennedy believes
that Lacan's psychoanalytic practice is instructive for legal analysis. 48 While
the Lacanian analysis is "neither critical nor constructive," the analyst and
analysand venture into the symbolic, through and between conscious and
unconscious codes, and "a constituting exchange ... permits momentary
glimpses of the totality ... . ,,49 Thus, "Lacan's approach suggests the
possibility for contextual insight within an awareness of ambiguous signs
and unknowable origins."' 50 The modesty is striking, but the theoretical
promise, perhaps barely, avoids nihilism.
Peter Goodrich, a British scholar who participated in the first Round
Table on Law and, Semiotics,'5 ' believes that
[1]egal education, the institutionalization of the future custodians of the
law, is an exemplary object of analytical study in terms of the classical
Freudian categories and languages of conscious and unconscious states,
of the antinomy of the pleasure principle and the reality principle, in
terms of desire and repression played out in the internalized form of
parapraxis [e.g., a slip of the tongue], of transference, complex [e.g.,
of repressed desires], obligation and censorship." 2
Goodrich identifies two facets of the disciplinary tradition of law: the
positive "idealizations present in and presented to the student of law," and
the negative "processes of prohibition and censorship whereby the student
146. Id. at 42-44.
147. H. MARCUSE, supra note 5, at 16.
148. Kennedy, supra note 10, at 282 n.180.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. The annual Round Table is held at Penn State-Berks (Reading), and is organized by
Roberta Kevelson, the director of the Center for Semotic Research in Law, Government and
Economics. The papers from the first Round Table are published in I LAW AND SEMoTICS
(R. Kevelson ed. 1987).
152. Goodrich, Psychoanalysis in Legal Education: Notes on the Violence of the Sign, in
LAw AND SE)MOTICS, supra note 151, at 200 (footnote omitted).
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of law internalizes the limits of legal argument."' Enter psychoanalysis,
which
as method, language and voice represents precisely that disordering or
denial of unity and of control over meaning that law and doctrine exist
to disallow, to cover over. Psychoanalysis speaks of and intermit-
tently provides a text for that which is inadmissable, constrained or
undisclosed in the liberal culture of the individual."'
While the psychoanalytical account of legal education will face obstacles
not unlike the analysand's defenses in clinical analysis,'55 we have a duty
to speak out, despite how unbearable our voice to the institution, in "view
of the irreducible damage that law does to our lives, in view of the absence
of any limit to its encroachment upon the 'private sphere,' that sphere
which appears to have no other function than that of providing a reference
point, which is also a vanishing point ,"51 Goodrich's provisional
exploration, which (informed by Freud as well as by Lacan, Kristeva,
Foucault, Derrida and Irigaray) sees psychoanalysis as a "theory of inter-
pretation and an epistemology of language," implicates law and legal
doctrines and institutions generally His concerns parallel those of CLS-
hierarchical training in law schools, hidden discourses or structures of power
in law, and the repression of alternatives.
The potential for Freud in CLS is not so much in "opening up new
avenues of inquiry," but in explicating and thereby enriching the critique
of ideology that is already implied in the CLS canon. In the search for the
process or mechanism whereby legal ideology is confirmed or legitimated in
society, the psychoanalytic tradition teaches that society introduces
into each individual its own ideological axes, which then become the
generative kernels of emotions, attitudes and modes of relating to others
These axes are profoundly unconscious, entering into each of us
through our early and most intense contacts with others who already
bear the weight of ideology upon them.'"
153. Id. Legal "education provides irrefragable authorities, irrefutable norms, incon-
testable truths or it provides a surrogate father figure;" it also "imposes a canon of
argument and of correct meanings [that] exclude and denigrate those discourses that are based
upon emotive and non-centripetal categories of communicative competence " Id. at 200-
01.
154. Id. at 195-96.
In raising the question of the manner in which the individual as subject is
temporarily and psychically constructed analysis is led eventually to question an
order of repression, of motives and of the unconscious, in which the laws
governing the forms of discourse, of the possibilities of speech, are inscribed in
the very constitution of subjectivity.
Id. at 196.
155. Id. at 197, 204.
156. Id. at 208; id. at 204 (citing Lacan) ("What is monstrous to the educational institution,
to the scriveners of the codicils, is the advent of a rhetoric which writes differently, which
collapses and inverts the authoritarian hierarchies inscribed in grammar itself ").
157 S. FROSH, supra note 25, at 269.
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C. Freudian Criticism of CLS
Robin West recently explored the relationship between legal liberalism
and Freud's "understudied but provocative" notion of the Rule of Law. 158
West's exposition, however, also introduced an implied criticism of leftist
legal scholarship, based upon Freudian social and political theory.
Briefly, Freud identified a "problem of power" in civilization arising
from the aggressive, antisocial instinctual desires of individuals that cannot
be neutralized by the capacity for altruism, empathy or love. 59 The Rule
of Law, for Freud, was history's solution to the problem, as illustrated by
the story of the "father horde." Once the brothers of the horde killed the
all-powerful father, their remorse led to collective obedience to the substitute
father-the totem-and its commands, including a prohibition against killing
the totem ammal and each other. 16 The Rule of Law, West explains,
originates for Freud in this state of artificial equality under the murder
taboo.
The potential for eros, the love instinct, to hold civilization together is
problematic for Freud (if not Marcuse). Not only does eros struggle against
an equally powerful death instinct, but eros is itself ambivalent toward
civilization. The fundamental erotic instinct is oriented to relationships
between couples, not large social groups. "Protection for the communal
unit," therefore, "must be found elsewhere.' 16'
Institutionalized guilt, followed by "renunciatory obedience to a protective
and impersonal authority," is, for Freud, the historical resolution reflected
in both the father horde story and in modem civilization's Rule of Law. 62
West argues that Freud's scheme is instructive for contemporary legal
liberalism, as well as law and economics scholarship. Significantly for the
present study, West then contrasts the Freudian conception of the Rule of
Law with critical and feminist legal scholarship. While acknowledging the
aggressive, antisocial element in humanity, the critical tradition challenges
Freud's lack of confidence in "communritanan" drives to unify civilization.
Thus, to the Freudian and liberal prormse that law can bring artificial
equality and therefore freedom from the tyranny of unequal power, the
feminist and critical scholars answer with their own promise that law at
its best can bring an empathic and loving community and, with that, a
release from the anguish of alienation and separateness. 13
158. West, sutjra note 8, at 818.
159. Id. at 822.
160. Id. at 823-24 (citing S. FRauD, ToTEM AND TABoo 184-85 (A. Brill trans. 1918)).
161. Id. at 834.
162. Id. at 835-36.
163. Id. at 860-61.
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The depersonalized Rule of Law, based upon a fear of love, is for the
critics "an obstacle to the encouragement of intersubjective umty."'1
West finds a response to critical scholarship in the early pages of Civili-
zation and Its Discontents, where Freud confesses he can find no feeling
of "oceamc oneness" in himself. 16S The well-demarcated boundary between
self and the world-rejected by critical scholars-is fundamental for Freud-
ian psychology. While romantic love between two individuals "melts away"
the boundary between ego and object, umversal love-indifferent to reci-
procity-disproves any notion of "oceamc" union. Freud attributes the
"oceamc feeling" to infantile memories wherein the ego is not yet distin-
guished from the world. By contrast, the totemic impulse is based upon the
"capacity for obedience and the memory of helplessness"; the affection
binding social groups together is for the leader, not one another.1"6
West concludes the study by praising Freud's naturalistic method and
chides legal liberals for choosing the "path of faith" over the "path of
reason." At the same time, West concedes that Freud's description of our
nature and history "may well be false." West's point is that legal theorists
should defend the authority of law "by reference to naturalistic, and
therefore falsifiable, assumptions," to "fact instead of faith."' 167
Such confidence, of course, is at odds with the critical theory that West
contrasts with orthodox Freudiaism. West clearly identifies the reason why
Freud's own theories about law are not compelling at all to the critical and
femnist scholars. Not only are Freud's naturalistic assumptions questiona-
ble, but the very scientific method West praises is not properly contrasted
with faith. For those in the critical tradition, the element of belief is present
in all of science, and every scientific enterprise is ideological to the core.168
West's exposition also demonstrates that CLS will likely draw its Freu-
diamsm from Marcuse or Lacan and not from the "scientific" Freud.
Sufficient doubt has been raised concerning the positivistic value of Freud's
writings, 69 and even Marcuse, in his attack of Freudian revisionism, prized
Freud's anthropological speculation for its symbolic value.
164. Id. at 863.
165. Id. at 865 (citing S. FREuD, CrvuizAToN AND ITs DlscouNrTEs, supra note 30, at 11).
166. Id. at 866-68 (citing S. FRuD, CivnimTioN AND ITS DisCONTmNrs, supra note 30, at
12-19).
167. Id. at 881.
168. See, e.g., Freeman & Mensch, Religion as Science/Science as Religion: Constitutional
Law and the Fundamentalist Challenge, 2 TmKTN 69 (Nov./Dec. 1987) ("[S]cientific meth-
odology cannot claim any objective, transcendent separation from social and political life.
Science is rooted in the culture within which it operates, and its underlying presuppositions
are always a part of that social context.").
169. See S. FROSH, supra note 25, at 6-9 (summary of scientific criticisms of Freud). For
two sympathetic accounts of the "scientificity" of contemporary psychoanalysis, see generally
Eagle, The Epistemological Status of Psychoanalysis, 56 Soc. Rs. 383 (1989); and Holland,
Scientificity and Psychoanalysis: Insights from the Controversial Discussions, 17 INT'L Rnv.
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VII. DEFINING AND OVERCOMING I6EOLOGY
"As is well known, the accusation of being in ideology only applies to
others, never to oneself 12170
Critical Legal Studies is itself the subject of criticism-that CLS is not
new, that its critique is useless or non-empirical, and so forth. Again, even
if conceived as a useful and liberating critique of ideology, CLS inherits
two problems which plague similar social theones. First, what is ideology? 7'
And second, if it exists as an inevitable perceptual grid or linguistic power
structure, how does the critic overcome its effect on his or her own
critique?72
The implicit role of psychoanalytic theory within CLS begins to answer
these questions. In this section, I first return to Lacan in order to explore
Althusser's commentary (which analogizes the unconscious and ideology)
and Peter Gabel's psychoanalytic critique of legal culture (which is inspired
by Lacaman concepts). A definition of ideology emerges that can also serve
to define legal ideology. Next, I consider Habermas' early commentary on
Freud, which emphasized the self-reflective element in psychoanalysis, keep-
ing in mind that Habermas has substantially altered his theoretical concerns.
Finally, I attempt to describe a tentative agenda for radical socio-legal
psychoanalysis.
A. Lacan (and Althusser)
"Lacan made a very successful career out of saying things that just
about no one could understand. He seems to have gone t6 great
lengths to prevent people from finding out what he had to say.'1 7
PsYcHo-ANALYsis 133 (1990). Eagle argues:
What is known as psychoanalytic theory is a rather heterogeneous, loosely
constructed set of formulations [that] range from ones that can reasonably
be subjected to empical test, at least in theory, to those that are quite unsus-
ceptible to empical evaluation. Hence, any sweeping unqualified statements-
such as "Psychoanalysis is a science" or "Psychoanalysis is not a science"-are
likely to be inaccurate and incomplete.
Eagle, supra, at 386.
Holland argues that Freud's functionalistic, or positivist, perspective was the first of three
"contradictory and distorted" paradigms inhabited by Freud (the others desiguated as the
"interpretive" and the "radical humanist"): "All of them wrong and incomplete, but all that
he had, and so much more than anybody has enjoyed before or after him." Holland, supra,
at 142.
170. L. ArTmssER, supra note 109, at 175.
171. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
172. That is, "How did [CLS writers'] souls survive uncorrupted?" Schwartz, With Gun
and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 STAN. L. R-v. 413, 446 (1984).
173. S. ScHNEiDEEmAN, JACQUES LAcAN: THE DEATH OF AN INT CTUAL HERO vi (1983).
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Lacanian climcal analysis, which seeks verbalization of the patient's
unconscious, 17 4 is an attempt to escape "normal" (or civil, coherent and
rational) communication between analyst and analysand, and thereby "to
discover another logic.' 17 The controversial "short session" (Lacan's re-
pudiation of the traditional "fifty minute hour") serves to keep the anal-
ysand off balance-"the analysand [does] not have time to get his beanngs,
to establish his sense of being in control of the situation, to get his thoughts
in order.'176 In Freudian terms, the short session, which may last only a
couple of minutes, frustrates the ego's censorship and explanatory functions:
Almost by definition, the ego can never be the master of the short
session.
This ego, however, asserts itself with a vengeance, not only in
trying to control the situation but in offering interpretations This
mode of interpretation is eventually revealed to be the system that holds
the neurosis in place.'"
The analyst, in this conception, ignores the intentions of the ego, and "hears
the discourse of the other, the unconscious that slides through the gaps in
intentionality ,,178
Louis Althusser's reliance upon Freud (and commentary upon Lacan) is
particularly relevant to the question of the place of psychoanalysis in CLS's
critique of ideology. Marx's early conception of ideology as "the system of
the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social
group" is later formulated (in The German Ideology) in a "plainly positiv-
istic context"*
Ideology is conceived as a pure illusion, a pure dream, i.e. as nothing-
ness. All its reality is external to it. Ideology is thus thought as an
174. Id. at 57. "All the analyst can do is offer to the patient access to speech. This speech,
being described as free association, is not centered on a particular subject; the only subject
the analyst recognizes is the subject of the unconscious." Id. at 116.
For Lacan, language is "the precondition of the unconscious, and speech is the instrument
of cure." Schneiderman, The Most Controversial Freudian Since Freud, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
Apr. 1978, at 56.
175. S. SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 173, at 118. Lacan "felt that analysis should offer
another structure, a structure that was not identical with that of everyday life." Id. at 143.
176. Id. at 151. "Lacan must have felt that talking too much often was used as a resistance
to avoiding the issues." Id. at 138.
177. Id. at 134. Bringing a neurotic condition into consciousness "does produce some
changes in the attitude of the neurotic toward his neurosis, but it does not alter the structure
in any fundamental way." Id.
178. Id. According to another commentator, Lacan acknowledged Freud's discovery
that truth manifests itself in the letter rather than the spirit, that is, in the way
things are actually said rather than in the intended meaning. The psycho-
analyst learns to listen not so much to her patient's main point as to odd marginal
moments, slips of the tongue, unintended disclosures.
J. GALLop, Ra.ADnNo LAcAN 22 (1985); cf. supra note Il, at 338 (Frederic Jameson's remark)
(language "constitutes that primary social instance into which the pre-verbal, pre-social facts
of archaic or unconscious experience find themselves somehow inserted").
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imaginary construction whose status is exactly like the theoretical status
of the dream among writers before Freud. For these writers, the dream
was the purely imaginary ... 179
Althusser's own view of ideology, as the 'representation' of the imaginary
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence," confirms
the material existence of ideologies.11 However, ideology is eternal, as
"individuals are always-already interpellated [hailed, recruited or trans-
formed] by ideology as subjects."'18 Althusser draws support for his thesis
from Freud's discovery of the familial ideological configuration into which
we are born.8 2 This
configuration is, m its umqueness, highly structured, and .. it is in
this implacable and more or less 'pathological' .. structure that the
[child] will have to 'find' 'its' place .... It is clear that this ideological
constraint and pre-appointment, and all the rituals of rearing and then
education in the family, have some relationship with what Freud studied
in the forms of the pre-genital and genital "stages" of sexuality, i.e. in
the "grip" of what Freud registered by its effects as being the uncon-
scious."
In this way, the eternity of ideology is related to Freud's eternal uncon-
scious.1
84
179. L. ALTnussER, supra note 109, at 159. "In fact, The German Ideology does offer us
an explicit theory of ideology, but it is not Marxist " Id. at 158.
180. Id. at 162. Althusser wants to adopt Marx's conception of ideology while avoiding its
positivism. Jameson refers to Althusser's definition of ideology-nspired by Lacan-as the
"first new and as yet msufficientiy developed conception of the nature of ideology since Marx
and Nietzsche " Jameson, supra note 111, at 393-94. Ideological representation must "be
seen as that indispensable mapping fantasy or narrative by which the individual subject invents
a 'lived' relationship with collective systems which otherwise by definition exclude him insofar
as he or she is born into a pre-existent social form and its pre-existent language." Id. at 394.
For recent criticism of Althusser, see Smith, Ideology and Interpretation: The Case of Althusser,
10 Potics TODAY 493, 499-500 (1989) (Althusser "risks substituting one form of [Marxian]
determinsm for another, linguistic for econonuc"; moreover, Althusser's post-modermst
tendencies lead to nihilism); Nielsen, The Concept of Ideology: Some Marxist and Non-Marxist
Conceptualizations, 2 REisNalo MARXsM, Winter 1989, at 146, 157-61; and P RICOEUR,
LEcTuREs ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 103-58 (G. Taylor ed. 1986).
181. L. ALTussER, supra note 109, at 176.
182. Id.
183. Id., see also R. LAINo, THE Poirmcs oF Tm FAmiY AND OTma EssAYs 3-19 (1971).
Note, however, that R.D. Laing's theory of the "divided self" is to be distinguished from,
and indeed is opposed to, Lacan's topology of the psyche. See E. RAGLmaD-SULUVAN, supra
note 96, at 62:
Laing (following Winmcott) makes a Rousseauesque division between true and
false images of self ("true" belonging to the natural and good inner self and
"false" to the distorting, repressive effects of the social realm). Lacan's
subject, on the other hand, is a paradox of true and false . No final
separation exists, therefore, between the inside and outside realms.
For a more conventional treatment of the familial configuration, from the perspective of
family, therapy and its basis in systems theory, see Minuchin, Families and Individual
Development: Provocations from the Field of Family Therapy, 56 CmwL Dav. 289 (1985).
184. L. ALTHUssER, supra note 109, at 161 (emphasis in original) ("ideology is eternal,
exactly like the unconscious").
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Althusser recognizes Lacan's "return to Freud" as an attempt to define
rigorously the unconscious and its laws." 5 Recall Lacan's statement that the
unconscious is structured like a language. Aided by structural linguistics,
Lacan discovered that the transition from birth into human existence "can
only be grasped in terms of a recurrent language [of the cure situation]
localized within the law of language in which is established and presented
all human order, i.e. every human role.' ' l 6 This transition is achieved within
the "Law of Culture" (Althusser's term), the determinate ideological for-
mations that have "been lying in wait for each infant born since before his
birth, [seizing] him before his first cry, assigmng to him hs place and role,
and hence his fixed destination.' 187
B. Gabel
"[For Lacan,] psychoanalysis is based on a fundamental split between
the subject and the knowledge he has of himself. Psychoanalysis deals
particularly with wishes and desires that are unknown to the subject,
and appear only in the unconscious." 18'
Peter Gabel, whose work is associated with CLS scholarship, clearly
employs psychoanalytic language and concepts. One of his most recent
essays focuses on the social and intersubjective nature of desire, and the
need for those involved in progressive politics to understand the desire for
social confirmation. Reagan's economic and social agenda, as well as
President Bush's campaign, were responsive to human needs for community
and solidarity."89 In contrast, the job and benefit programs of today's
Democrats may be "experienced as psychologically repressive to the degree
that . . people's emotional context-their sense of unconnectedness and
underconfirmation-[is treated] as fixed and inevitable."' 190 Both political
parties appear to avoid confronting-by offering only "fantasies" or "pro-
grams"-"the real alienation and blockage of social desire that is our most
serious problem as a people."' 9'
185. Id. at 199-201.
186. Id. at 209.
187. Id. at 211; see also id. at 211 n.4 (defining "Law of Culture").
188. B. BENvENuTo & R. KENNEDY, supra note 97, at 18.
189. Gabel, Dukakis's Defeat and the Transformative Possibilities of Legal Culture, 4
TXKuN 14 (Mar./Apr. 1989) [hereinafter Gabel, Dukakis's Defeat] ("Although the moral
vision of the conservatives has been to a large degree imaginary the right's symbolic
discourse has recognized the centrality of social desire to politics and has offered at least
compensatory fantasies to alleviate, at the intrapsychic level, the alienation of everyday life.").
For a similar analysis of the junsprudence of original intention as an imaginary psychopolitical
account of our connection to one another, see Gabel, Founding Father Knows Best: A
Response to Tushnet, 1 TiKK N 41 (Mar./Apr. 1986), reprinted in 36 ButrALo L. Rzv. 227
(1987).
190. Gabel, Dukakis's Defeat, supra note 189, at 14.
191. Id. at 15.
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"Desire" is nowadays associated with the instinctual forces of the id that
must be controlled. 19 Such a model results in the separation of desire from
knowledge (as m "dispassionate" social science), and in the "individuali-
zation" and "privatization" of desire. 93 The desire for mutual recognition
that we experience and perceive in others
is resisted and even opposed by those around us who have learned .
to deny this desire in themselves. The medium of this opposition is well-
captured by what . . Lacan called "misrecognition," a process by
which the parent, instead of confirming the infant in his or her being,
"throws" the infant and later the child into a series of roles that ...
alienate the child... from the centered desire that is the social dimension
of the child's soul.-
The split between the child's desire and his or her social self will be
reproduced in others through familial and social contacts; moreover, the
desire may be repeatedly repressed in an effort to maintan the validity of
the internalized role. 95
192. Id.
193. Id. at 15-16.
194. Id. at 16. For a similar analysis of childhood cuhminating in the divided self, see R.
UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERsoNALrrY 151-65 (1984). Jameson described the Lacanian
"Unconscious"
as that reality of the subject wluch has been alienated and repressed through the
very process by which, in receiving a name, it is transformed into a representation
of itself.
This production of the Unconscious by way of a primary repression which is
none other than the acquisition of language is then reinterpreted in terms of the
communicational situation as a whole . [A] distinct dimension of [the above-
mentioned lingustic alienation is] the inescapable mediation of other people, and
more particularly of the Other or in other words the parents: yet here the
Law represented by the parents, and in particular by the father, passes over into
the very nature of language itself, which the child receives from the outside and
which speaks [to] him just as surely as he learns to speak it.
Jameson, supra note 1II, at 363-64.
195. Gabel, Dukakis's Defeat, supra note 189, at 16. Robin West's recent attack upon
Gabel's psychoanalytic account as "deeply gendered" must here be acknowledged. See West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. RFv. 1, 45 (1988). Fenumst scholars have convincingly
identified the male perspective in contemporary junsprudence. See, e.g., O'Donovan, Engen-
dering Justice: Women's Perspectives and the Rule of Law, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 127, 131
(1989) (citing C. Dalton, Remarks on Personhood (Jan. 5, 1985) (paper presented at AALS
panel)) (Rawls' theoretical construct-the person who chooses civil libertanamsm-"represents
the caricature of a 'male' personality type"); Lahey, " Until Women Themselves Have
Told All That They Have to Tell. ", 23 OscoODE HALL L.J. 519, 526 (1985) (emphasis in
original) ("[T]he male perspective has its own point of view, and fermsts object to
treating the male point of view as a universal point of view."). West argues that all modem
legal theory-"liberal legalism" as well as "critical legal theory"-"is essentially and irretnev-
ably masculine" by virtue of a shared "separation thesis." West, supra, at 2.
Liberal legalists, in short, describe an inner life enlivened by freedom and
autonomy from the separate other, and threatened by the danger of annihilation
by him. Critical legal theorists, by contrast, tell a story of inner lives dominated
by feelings of alienation and isolation from the separate other, and enlivened by
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While the parent-child relationship may be the first locus for alienation,
the distance between our desire and our social selves is maintained in schools
and workplaces, through the media and in the various social structures that
make up the apparently "given" world. 19 6 At the same time, the "blockage"
is maintained by the individual's reciprocal projection of an "outside"
world and deference-'"in a milieu of misrecognition and collective de-
nial"-to an external agency to ground his or her identity 197 For Gabel,
the circle of underconfirmation is not a problem for climcal psychoanalysis,
but is rather a political problem requiring a gradual increase in public
confidence. 198
the possibility of association and community with him. Each story
constitutes a legitimate and true part of the total subjective experience of
masculinity.
Id. at 5. Women, on the other hand, are not essentially separate, and are distinctively
"connected" to one another in the experiences of pregnancy, heterosexual penetration, men-
struation and breast feeding. Id. at 2-3; see also id. at 14 ("Women are actually or potentially
materially connected to other human life. Men aren't.").
While women experience, West explains, fear of the unnatural state of separation, it is not
the same dread of natural, male alienation identified in the CLS canon. Id. at 40-41. Thus
Gabel's story "of attachment, separation, longing, rejection, repression, humiliation and then
alienation is a story of male development, not female." Id. at 45. West is eventually
constructive: "Gabel has confused is male experience of separation and alienation with
'human' experience because women have not made clear that our day-to-day, lived
experience is incommensurable with men's. We need to flood the market with our own
stories " Id. at 65.
196. Gabel, Dukakis's Defeat, supra note 189, at 106 ("These circular or 'rotating' processes
of demal in which each person passes the same doubt on to the next person (or often to
millions of people at once, as in the case of the newscaster) also account for the phantom
phenomena we usually refer to as 'social structures."').
197. Id. at 106-07
198. Id. at 107. Gabel's work parallels the approach of Michael Lerner (editor of Tikkun;
Gabel is a frequent contributor to, and associate editor of, Tikkun). See M. LERNER, SURPLUS
PowERLEssNEss: THE PSYCHODYNAMICS OF EVERYDAY LFE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INDiviDuAL AND SocIAL. TRANSFoRMATION x-xi (1986) (Lerner acknowledges that his ideas were
refined through discussions with Gabel). Gabel's recognition of the need for public confidence
appears to reflect Lemer's conception of "Surplus Powerlessness "IT]he set of feelings and
beliefs that make people think of themselves as even more powerless than the actual power
situation requires, and then leads them to act in ways that actually confirm them in their
powerlessness." Id. at ii. Surplus Powerlessness "is the new form by which people are kept
enslaved. It is inside our own heads, and it is recreated by us in every thought that assumes
that how things are is the equivalent of 'reality."' Id. at 4-5. In addition to conscious,
usguided assessments of power, Surplus Powerlessness functions most effectively through a
Social Unconscious: "shared meamngs that most people assume in their daily interactions with
others of which they are not aware and which they would resist knowing should they be
pointed out." Id. at 12. However, and precisely "because denial of our fundamental human
.needs hurts so much, there is continual hope that we will break through our isolation and
connect with each other in a deeper way and find ways to change the larger situation." Id.
at 16. Significantly, Lerner sees the summary dismissal of religious insights by the Marxian
and psychoanalytic traditions as a senous mistake: "As an alternative, the religious worldview
helps to challenge the domnant society's attempt to frame reality as 'that which is' at the
moment. The religious worldview opens up the social, intellectual and emotional space to
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Legal culture, which provides a particularly visible example of mediation
between local ("concrete") conflicts or needs and the national or universal
(the larger "we") context, tends to reinforce the collective demal identified
by Gabel.'9 Lawyers and judges, and legal reasoning itself, are "disembod-
ied" and elevated in our society- "[Law] is made to appear as an authori-
tative system of thought outside of and above everyone rather than as
a contingent and developing expression of social and political meaning that
we actively create and interpret. ' 200 Legal discourse is thus an embodiment
of the dynamic projection of underconfirmed subjects of an externalized
source of social authority 201
Gabel concludes his analysis by suggesting that progressive lawyers recon-
stitute legal culture by systematically challenging "the modes of role-based,
disembodied interaction" in everyday life, and thereby begin to affirm social
desire. 21 Public interest lawyers have too often accepted, Gabel explains,
"the confines and assumptions of existing legal discourse and roles," thus
relegating their own political and moral aspirations to their "private" lives.201
The transformative dimension of progressive legal practice will continue to
be neutralized unless this ideological contradiction is recogmzed. 20 4
C. Habermas
Habermas' reflections on psychoanalysis, published in Knowledge and
Human Interests, now belong to history-to the "early Habermas." ' 2 5 The
imagine a quite different way of approaching reality." Id. at 265.
In a recent book, Unger attempts to critique and restate the Chnstian-romantic view of
human identity. See R. UNGER, supra note 194. Unger there identified "two connected tasks:
the development of a psychology of empowerment and the analysis of the social conditions
on which empowerment depends." Id. at 72. While we are mentally and socially structured
by "institutional or imaginative assumptions" taken as given, we can break through and revise,
or invent new, formative contexts." Id. at 7-8. For example,
we are empowered by freeing our understanding of society from superstition.
The characteristic form of superstition about society is the superstition of false
necessity: the ease with which we mistake the constraints imposed by a particular
formative context of social life for the inherent psychological, orgamzational,
and economic imperatives of society.
Id. at 14.
199. Gabel, Dukakis's Defeat, supra note 189, at 107-08.
200. Id. at 108. The judge's platform and robe, and the attorney's "glassy-eyed, disembodied
power-discourse in spite of the strain required to keep it up," serve to alienate citizens "from
the political community that the lawyer or judge is supposed to represent." Id.
201. Id. at 109 ("the categories of legal discourse form a perceptual gnd that is experienced
by most people as 'the way things are'); see also Gabel, A Critical Anatomy of the Legal
Opinion, V ALSA FORUM 5, 10 (Fall 1980) ("[T]he social function of law is not to be found
in its direct effect on socio-economic activity, but rather in its effect on people's minds.").
202. Gabel, Dukakis's Defeat, supra note 189, at 110-11.
203. Id. at 110.
204. See id. at I11.
205. See Bernstein, Introduction to HABERMAS AND MODERNrY 12 (R. Bernstein ed. 1985)
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theoretical exposition in Knowledge and Human Interests has been recog-
nized as flawed, even by Habermas, yet the essays on psychoanalysis are
significant for the problems introduced if not the solutions offered.2 The
fact is that Habermas' early work left much to be clarified and justified.
In 1968 Habermas viewed psychoanalysis as "the only tangible example
of a science incorporating methodical self-reflection," even though Freud
himself misunderstood the scientific aspect of the discipline he discovered.a2
Psychoanalysis thus represented a new version of cultural interpretation
directed not at the conscious intentions of language, but at the "self-
deceptions of the author. . inaccessible to him and alienated from lum
and yet [his] nevertheless. "m The mistakes in the text of everyday language
(or action or bodily expression), normally ignored (or so obtrusive to be
called symptoms) and, in any case, incomprehensible to the speaker, are
("Habermas soon came to realize that the systematic program sketched in Knowledge and
Human Interests was seriously flawed In [The Theory of Communicative Action], and
in the writings leading up to it, one can discern a new systematic synthesis-which preserves
Habermas's earlier insights, corrects its inadequacies, and points to new directions for re-
search.").
206. Bernstein, supra note 205, identifies four major flaws in Habermas' theory. First, there
"is a radical ambiguity in the basic concepts of reflection and self-reflection[;]" Habermas
failed to distinguish between Kantian "self-reflection of reason upon the conditions of its
employment" and the emancipatory self-reflection "that aims at freeing a subject 'from
ideological frozen forms of dependence that can in pnnciple be transformed."' Id. at 12
(quoting Kant's Critique); see also infra note 220 and accompanying text. The second major
flaw involves a failure to show "how we can at once justify the claim that there are unavoidable
necessary umversai conditions of commumcative action and rationality, and maintain that these
can be discovered and warranted in a scientific manner." Bernstein, supra note 205, at 13.
Thirdly, Habermas obscured "the intrinsic mtersubjective and dialogical character of com-
mumcative action." Id. at 14. Finally, no critical social science was systematically articulated.
Id. at 14-15. Bernstein argues that Habermas' recent work substantially addresses these four
shortcormngs.
With respect to Habermas' retreat from Critical Theory's synthesis of Freud and Marx, see
Whitebook, Reason and Happiness: Some Psychoanalytic Themes in Critical Theory, m
HABEmAs AND MODERNTY, supra note 205, at 140-60 (Adorno and Marcuse as id-psycholo-
gists). See also LaCapra, supra note 23, at 249 (Habermas' ego-psychological perspective)
(citing M. JAY, MARXISM AND TOTALITY: THE ADvENTuRES OF A CONcEPT FROM LuIAcs TO
HABERMAS 480-81 (1984)) (discussing Habermas).
[W]hereas the patient and analyst shared an a priori interest in relieving the
patient's neurotic symptoms, in society no such consensus could be assumed.
Indeed, insofar as certain men or classes benefited from the maintenance of
ideological distortion and exploitative power relations, there was no reason to
assume they would willingly enter the process of dialogic enlightenment suggested
by the psychoanalytic model. Nor would their improved understanding of reality
necessarily generate a desire to transform it.
La Capra, supra note 23, at 249.
207. Habermas, Self-Reflection as Science: Freud's Psychoanalytic Critique of Meaning, in
J. H AiRmAs, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERSTS 214 (J. Shapiro trans. 1971) (first published
in 1968).
208. Id. at 218 (emphasis in original).
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"spit-off" parts of a symbolic structure, another language.20 The dream
provides the pathological model of such a text for Freud, and dream
interpretation also illustrates the defense mechanisms so central to psycho-
analysis: "The transformation of the latent dream-thoughts into the manifest
dream-content ... is the first instance known to us of psychical material
being changed over from one mode of expression to another ,,2i0 Freud
identified, in the systematic distortion of latent, symbolic "dream-thoughts"
in the manifest dream, a restricting agency that even controls everyday
thought and actionf.21' The defensive or "censorship" agency, representing
social repression, is in conflict with unconscious wishes or motivations, and
distorts the meaning of ("displacement") or eradicates the offensive passages
of the text of the unconscious. 21 2
The "object domain" of psychoanalysis is the field of incomprehensible
symbols which disrupt everyday language. 2 3 Significantly, the project is not
akin to translation of a text to mediate between people with different
languages, but is rather an effort to teach a person to comprehend his or
her own self-mutilated language. 2 4 The act of understanding is self-con-
sciousness or self-reflection, as exemplified in Freud's analytic technique. 215
When the patient's defensive mechanisms "run idl[y] ' 21 6 in the analytic
209. Habermas, Peirce's Logic of Inquiry: The Dilemma of a Scholastic Realism Restored
by the Logic of Language, in J. HABERMAs, supra note 207, at 110-11; see C. ALFORD,
NARCISSISM: SoCRATES, THE FRANKFuRT SCHOOL, AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 166 (1988):
In key respects Habermas's view of psychoanalysis resembles that of Lacan. Both
see it as hermeneutics.
Yet the views of Lacan and Habermas are hardly identical. For Habermas,
the goal of analysis is the reestablishment of the autonomous individual on
a new basis. For Lacan, the goal is to show that the very idea of rational
individuality is a veil
210. Freud, On Dreams, in 5 CoMP.Em PSYCHOLOGICAL WoiKs, supra note 67, at 642.
Habermas explained that three "layers" appear in dream interpretation, namely the patient's
rationalized elaboration, the manifest dream comprised of the "day's residues" and the "depth
layer with the symbolic contents that resist the work of interpretation." J. HABERMAs, supra
note 207, at 221.
211. See Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysts, in 22 COMPLETE PSYCHO-
LOGICAL WORKS, supra note 67, at 14. The censorship (or repression) of unconscious motives
is "slackened" in sleep and the motives thereby find a language. J. HAERMAS, supra note
207, at 224 ("The text of the dream can be conceived as a compromise between a
substitute social censorship contained in the self and unconscious motives [U]nder the
exceptional conditions of sleep, unconscious motives push forward into the material of the
preconscious, which can be publicly communicated ").
212. J. HABERmAs, supra note 207, at 223-24.
213. Id. at 226.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 228. Note that for Freud the patient does not suffer from ignorance, but from
resistances which cause and maintain this ignorance. Freud, "Wild" Psycho-Analysis, in I1
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS, supra note 67, at 225.
216. J. HABERms.S, supra note 207, at 232.
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situation, the ego recogmzes "itself in its other .. as its own alienated
self and [identifies] with it." '217
Habermas, in the custom of earlier critical theorists seeking a Freudo-
Marxian synthesis, saw structural parallels between the individual psyche
and contemporary culture. Collective solutions to the pressures of reality,
represented by various institutions of social organization, seemed to resemble
individual neurotic "solutions.1 218 Cultural tradition was understood as the
collective unconscious. 2 9 And, just as self-reflection in the analytic situation
liberates a patient from falsifications and self-deceptions, the critique of
ideology sets off a process of reflection upon and discourse concerning the
collective illusion of "frozen relations, of dependence that can in principle
be transformed. "220
D. Contours of a Psychoanalytic Critique of Legal Ideology
"Lacan shifts the Freudian paradigm from intrapsychic mechanisms to
intersubjective relations, and from quasi-biological instincts to language,
partially opening psychoanalysis to cultural theory."2'
Before attempting a summation and outline for the psychoanalytic criti-
cism of legal culture, I should acknowledge again the limited scope of my
inquiry. Lacanian theory is much richer in scope and potential than my
remarks suggest, Althusser's work on ideology is likewise quite substantial
and complex, and Habermas' ever-developing social theory is a major topic
in many disciplines. Moreover, I have not explored the work of many other
scholars who integrate psychoanalysis and ideology critique, for example,
Foucault's disclosure of strategies of power within discourse,2 and Deleuze
and Guattari's work on the Oedipus Complex.22 3 The suggestive remarks
that follow, therefore, are but further "traces" of the potential for psycho-
analytic concepts in critical legal research.
Keeping in mind the revisionistic parallel between the topology of the
individual psyche and that of culture, I will focus below on the concepts
217. Id. at 235-36 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 242 ("Freud conceived the defensive
process as the reversal of reflection analogous to flight, through which the ego conceals
itself from itself.").
218. Habermas, Psychoanalysis and Social Theory: Nietzsche's Reduction of Cognitive
Interests, in J. HABERMAS, supra note 207, at 276 ("Like the repetition compulsion from
within, institutional compulsion from without brings about a relatively rigid reproduction of
uniform behavior that is removed from criticism ").
219. Id. at 282.
220. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective, in J. HABERMAS,
supra note 207, at 310.
221. J. BRENKMAN, CULTURE AND DOMINATION x (1987).
222. See, e.g., M. FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGs: AN ARCHEOLOGY OF THE HuMAN
SCIENCES (1970).
223. See G. DELEUZE & F GuATTARI, ANTI-OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA (1977).
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of socialized roles, collective desire, and self-criticism as essential elements
of the critique of ideology Each involves a glimmer of liberation, the
elusive goal of radical social theory.
1. Roles
Freud's interpretation of childhood teaches that "the organization of
everyday life by the social institution of the restricted family [leaves] a clear
imprint on the course of [the] childhood experience-... ."n4 However,
Freud tended to view the child's psyche as a primary function and the
social environment as a secondary influence. By contrast, as John Brenkman
points out:
Lacan's project has been the attempt to give language and intersubjec-
tivity pnmacy ... He recognizes that the Umwelt, the environment or
outer world, of [the infant] is preeminently social. From birth, the
human being is affected by actions, gestures, wishes, and intentions that
are already imbued with the symbolic and that occur within the con-
straints of specific, historically determined institutions.22
That is, the subject is "radically dependent on the field of the Other" for
identity and for the language that eventually makes interaction possible.?
Recall that Althusser sees the family configuration as an ideology which
waits for each of us to be born and assigns our respective places or roles.
The family as social and socializing institution "limits the possibilities of
interaction which emerge in the experience of speech . . . 227
Many scholars associated with CLS have identified legal institutions and
processes as "arrangers" of everyday life, shaping and constraining the
situations and interactions we experience. Further, critics of legal ideology
can be conceived as cultural analysts who disclose or bring to the surface
hidden or unconscious belief systems concerning the law. However, while
such metaphors are suitable for ideology critique generally, they represent
an impoverished conception of psychoanalysis. Peter Gabel's recent
reflections on collective desire provide a richer analogy between the critical-
legal and the social-psychoanalytical projects.
224. J. BRENImAN, supra note 221, at 149.
225. Id. at 152. With respect to the ego's function, "there are no reality-altering actions
that are not already situated in and affected by the social network of a human community."
Id. at 155.
226. Id. at 152. For an empirical psychoanalytic-onented inquiry into the self-other rela-
tionship, in support of Brenkman, see Pipp, Sensonmotor and Representational Internal
Working Models of Self, Other, and Relationship: Mechanisms of Connection and Separation,
in THE SEF iN TRANsmoN: INFANcY TO CHILDHOOD (D. Cicchetti & M. Beeghley eds. 1990).
See generally Keil, Constraints on Knowledge and Cognitive Development, 88 PsYcHoLoIcA.L
REv. 197 (1981) (regarding the constraints of language).
227. J. BRENamAN, supra note 221, at 174.
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2. Desire
"In Lacaman terms, it is from the Other that the subject receives the
signifiers of his or her desire. The Other can refer to the child's
mother [who represents the community in her initial, exclusive hold on
discourse; but what] is radically Other is precisely 'the concrete discourse
of [the subject's] surroundings.' 'm
Gabel's account of social desire, which attempts to move beyond Lacan
(who insisted on the unintelligibility of desire and was "as unable to capture
what we are alienated from as Freud was"),22 posits a collective desire for
social confirmation and mutual recognition. He suggests that the social self
is often alienated or blocked from such real desire by our privatization of
desire and by collective denial of that social dimension. 030 The alienation or
blockage, in Gabel's somewhat ambiguous scheme, is reproduced (by re-
petitive repression of desire to maintain social roles) and maintained (by
deference to "phantom" social structures for identity and by reciprocal
projection of that "given" world) in a circle of denial and desire.? Legal
culture exemplifies role-based interaction wherein political or moral desire
is privatized in subjection to an externalized social authority 232
John Brenkman's psychoanalytic theory of culture, another attempt to
employ and go beyond Freud and Lacan, is similar in several respects to
Gabel's approach. Freud, in his neglect of the social constitution of the ego
and the social organization of "reality," grants to the ego only the ability
to adjust to reality 23 Lacan's restatement of Freudianism in social and
cultural terms (as a theory of the subject's constitution by and through
228. Id. at 146 (quoting and translating J. LACA, supra note 46, at 319).
229. See supra note 114; see also supra text accompanying note 97. Gabel's (and Brenkman's)
attempt to go beyond Lacan will, of course, be viewed by Lacamans as superficial. See, e.g.,
E. RAGcLAND-SurLLivA, supra note 96, at 66-67:
Psychologists who look for truth in "resolution" are destined to be
disenchanted Even the Other's Desire, which makes up the unconscious
discourse, is not a Dasem (being or existence), for it can only ever be partially
captured, and even that indirectly, intersubjectively, and transindividually.
The subject [of identifications and objectifications-the mot] is an
unbridgeable gap between a person's perceptions and alienation in relation to an
external Gestalt, an internal discourse, and Desire.
Therefore, for Lacamans,
Lacan's picture of the human subject accurately conveys the tragedy of natural
being. We are faced with a choice between individuation through psychic Cas-
tration (that is, learning difference by alienation into language, social conventions,
and rules) or failure to evolve an identity adequate to social functioning.
Id. at 273.
230. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 196.
232. See supra notes 200-01.
233. See J. BRENxmAN, supra note 221, at 166-68.
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language) initiates an immanent critique of psychoanalysis that Brenkman
incorporates into his own Neo-Marxian critique:
The critical theory of society and culture requires a theory of subjectivity
and lived experience, and in turning to psychoanalysis to develop that,
it discovers another task as well: to disclose those points in psychoan-
alytic theory where'hlstoncal forms of domination-principally the social
division of labor and the social organization of sexual difference-have
to become integral and primary elements of that theory itself.2
Gabel, too, seeks an enrichment of the critical-legal project by reference to
'psychoanalytic conceptions. The identification of social desire and its re-
pression illuminates the externalization and maintenance of legal authority.
Brenkman's reassessment of psychoanalysis also inspires hope for social
change. Repression of desire, which blocks the "subject's access to his or
her own history," is the ego's response to the conflict between desire and
present reality 231 If reality, however, is essentially social, then a third
orientation "toward the future and toward another reality" appears.2Y6 This
critical orientation implies the possibility of renouncing reality "not in the
mode of repression, which hampers the possibilities of the present under
the impact of an unlived and untold past, but in the mode of a liberation
which, comprehending the past and demanding a new future, condemns the
present."'137
Gabel's recognition of the need to reconstitute legal culture by challenging
"given" roles and contingent social structures provides an example of
Brenkman's "third onentation." Moreover, the problematic questions of
the existence and operation of legal ideology are directed by Gabel into a
reflection upon the division between desire (experienced and perceived in
others) and collective demal, between our privatized ideals and our social
selves, and between contingent realities.
3. Cultural Self-Criticism
The psychoanalytic project inspired by Lacan's Freud also provides a
model of self-criticism for the critic of legal ideology. Althusser's Lacanian
conception of the eternity of ideology contrasts sharply with the Marxian
notion of ideology as false consciousness, a term which suggests that the
critic is outside ideology. Indeed, the critic, at best, encourages cultural
self-awareness, hence the significance of the early Habermas' picture of
psychoanalysis as fundamentally self-reflective and his analogy between a
234. Id. at 150.
235. Id. at 167-68.
236. Id. at 168.
237. Id.
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patient's self-consciousness and social liberation. In Brenkman's construc-
tion:
Human knowledge cannot, especially when it pretends to be a scientific
knowledge of the forms of everyday cognition, detach itself from the
lived experiences out of which genuine subjectivity emerges.
This problematic, in which science is inseparable from politics in the
development of an understanding of human social, psychological, and
cultural life, never becomes visible in Freud and never completely breaks
into the clear in Lacan.Y
Gabel, I think, would agree, as he links his social theory directly to .politics:
"transcendent social knowledge can emerge only from transcendent social
experience."239
I would go further, avoiding the reduction to politics, and maintain that
all theory as well as everyday thought, is inseparable from ideology if we
take ideology to mean those belief systems that are often hidden (or
unconscious) but are subject to self-critical disclosure and discourse. In-
formed by the psychoanalytic tradition, such belief systems can now be seen
to include changeable social desire, repression and reality
CONCLUSION
One of the most .profound criticisms of CLS is that it does not really
exist-people "belong" to the movement, conferences are held, symposia
are published, but the essential legal theory is often elusive. Those who
criticize CLS by. attacking Roberto Unger find, to their surprise, that they
have only criticized Unger. If the same critics, wisely, reattack Unger,
Duncan Kennedy and Morton Horwitz, the critique might be ignored as a
harmless, but typically unenlightened, reification of CLS. The critic's dif-
ficulty results from the eclectic and disjointed character of a new intellectual
movement.
Works such as David Kennedy's exploration of Critical Theory and
Structuralism are particularly helpful in giving bearings to CLS adherents
and enemies.2 ° Jack Balkin's exposition of deconstruction, likewise, was a
238. Id. at 160-61.
239. Gabel, On Passionate Reason: Transcending Marxism and Deconstruction, 4 TIKKUN
9, 11 (Nov./Dec. 1989). Gabel confirms "the centrality of engaged, intuitive comprehension
to the construction of psychoanalytic knowledge," then explains:
The kind of critical social thought that I'm talking about here demands that
people passionately throw themselves forward into the lived experience of social
phenomena that surround them and attempt to illuminate through evocative
description, rather than detached analysis or "explanation," the universal reali-
zations and distortions of social desire that these diverse phenomena share across
the cultural richness of their differences.
Id. at 11.
240. See Kennedy, supra note 10.
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welcome but belated guide to much that was presumed in the CLS canon. 4
The potential for CLS to be understood, much less to contribute to
contemporary legal discourse, is dependent upon studies that seek the
connections between CLS scholarship and its methodological forebears. And,
just as traces of Marx and Habermas, Levi-Strauss and Derrida, need to
be identified and discussed, adopted or revised, the traces of Freud (and
Marcuse and Lacan) have yet undeternined significance.
241. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987).

